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CREW 4 You, INC. V. WILKINS: 1 THE OHIO SUPREME
COURT MISAPPLIES STATUTE AND PRECEDENT TO
ELIMINATE THE RESALE EXCEPTION TO SALES OF
EMPLOYMENT SERVICES
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1993, Ohio has levied a sales tax on employment services.2
Soon thereafter, Ohio's taxing authorities became fearful that if the
resale exception3 were available to sales of employment services, the
revenue attributable to the sales tax on employment services would
vanish.4 In its first opportunity to decide a case involving a resale
exception claim for sales of employment services, the Ohio Supreme
Court so narrowly defined the benefit of an employment service that it
appeared the resale exception could not apply to sales of employment
services.5
In Crew 4 You, Inc. v. Wilkins (2005),6 the Ohio Supreme Court
definitively precluded the possibility that the resale exception could ever
apply to a sale of employment services.7 Unfortunately, as part of its
1. Crew 4 You, Inc., v. Wilkins, 105 Ohio St. 3d 356 (2005).
2. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5739.01(JJ) (LexisNexis 1999), enacted by the 119th General
Assembly in Am. Sub. H.B. 904 (effective Jan. 1, 1993), 144 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 6598, 6689, 6797
(Section 131).
3. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5739.01(E)(1) (LexisNexis 1999). The resale exception
excludes from taxation transactions where the purpose of the purchaser is to resell the purchased
property or the benefit of the service provided in the same form to a person engaging in business.
Id.
4. See infra Part IV.B. I (discussing the Ohio Tax Commissioner's express, and the Supreme
Court's implied, concerns with the resale exception as it applies to employment services).
5. See Bellemar Parts Industries, Inc. v. Tracy, 88 Ohio St. 3d 351 (2000). As will be
discussed below, for a sale of an otherwise taxable service to be eligible for the resale exception, the
purchaser thereof must resell the benefit of that service in the same form in which it was received.
See OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5739.01(E)(1) (LexisNexis 1999). In Bellemar Parts, the Court
narrowly defined the benefit of an employment service as the labor of the temporary employees and
not the product of that labor. Bellemar Parts, 88 Ohio St. 3d at 354.
6. Crew 4 You, Inc. v. Wilkins, 105 Ohio St. 3d 356 (2005).
7. See id. at 364. The Court held that a sale of employment services could not qualify for the
resale exception unless the purchaser of those services actually sold employment services to its
customers. Id. For reasons discussed below, it is impossible for a purchaser of employment
1
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effort to eliminate the resale exception in the context of employment
services, the Court ignored clear statutory language and abandoned its
own precedent, creating uncertainty concerning the applicability of the
resale exception to all otherwise taxable services.
8
This Note critically examines the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion in
Crew 4 You. 9 Part II examines the tax on retail sales, the resale
exception and its application to services, and the significant Ohio
Supreme Court cases applying the resale exception to transactions
involving services.1 l Part III provides a synopsis of the arguments and
reasoning at each stage of the appeal in Crew 4 You, including the Tax
Commissioner's assessment, his Final Determination, the decision of the
Ohio Board of Tax Appeals ("BTA"), and the decision of the Ohio
Supreme Court.11 Part IV analyzes the Ohio Supreme Court's reasoning
in Crew 4 You, including its departure from the statutory text of the
resale exception and from its own precedent.12 Part IV also evaluates the
consequences of the Court's holding in Crew 4 You and suggests that a
different statutory scheme for the taxation of employment services may
have avoided the uncertainty created by the Court.' 3  Finally, Part V
concludes that the flawed analysis in Crew 4 You was likely the product
of a result-driven orientation.'
4
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Tax on Retail Sales and the Resale Exception
Under Section 5739.02 of the Ohio Revised Code ("O.R.C."), an
excise tax is levied on every retail sale made in Ohio. 15 One exception
services to resell employment services, as those services are defined in O.R.C. § 5739.01(JJ). See
infra note 127 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Parts IV.B.2, IV.B.3.
9. As will be discussed below, the Court misstated, incorrectly paraphrased, and
misconstrued both its own precedent and the statute embodying the resale exception. See infra Parts
IV.B.2, 1V.B.3.
10. See infra Part 11.
I1. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. Id.
14. See infra Part V.
15. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5739.02 (LexisNexis 2005). See O.R.C. § 5739.02(B)(l)-(46)
for numerous exemptions from the tax on retail sales. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5739.02(B)(l)-(46)
(LexisNexis 2005). Some interesting examples include "sales of food for human consumption off
the premises where sold" (O.R.C. § 5739.02(B)(2)), "sales of food sold to students only in a
cafeteria, dormitory, fraternity, or sorority maintained in a private, public, or parochial school,
college, or university" (O.R.C. § 5739.02(B)(3)), "sales not within the taxing power of [Ohio] under
[22:169
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to the sales tax levied by O.R.C. § 5739.02 is the resale exception of
O.R.C. § 5739.01(E)(1). 1 6  A critical feature of the resale exception
embodied in O.R.C. § 5739.01(E)(1) is its distinction between the resale
of tangible personal property and the resale of services. 
17
During the period of the Tax Commissioner's audit of Crew 4 You,
Inc. ("Crew 4 You"), O.R.C. § 5739.01(B)(3)(k) defined as a sale all
transactions in which "employment service is or is to be provided." 18
During the audit period, and presently, employment services were
defined in O.R.C. § 5739.01(JJ).' 9 The following section highlights the
the Constitution of the United States" (O.R.C. § 5739.02(B)(10)), "sales of ships or vessels or rail
rolling stock used or to be used principally in interstate or foreign commerce, and repairs,
alterations, fuel, and lubricants for such ships or vessels or rail rolling stock" (O.R.C.
§ 5739.02(B)(14)), and "sales of animals by nonprofit animal adoption services or county humane
societies" (O.R.C. § 5739.02(B)(28). OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5739.02(B)(2), (3), (10), (14), and
(28) (LexisNexis 2005).
16. During the period at issue, O.R.C. § 5739.01(E)(1) excluded from the definition of "sales"
all sales in which the purpose of the consumer "is to resell the thing transferred or benefit of the
service provided, by a person engaging in business, in the form in which the same is, or is to be,
received by the person." OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5739.01(E)(1) (LexisNexis 1999) (emphasis
added). The resale exception is an exception, and not an exemption, because sales that meet the
requirements of the resale exception are specifically excluded from the definition of a sale. Id. The
exemptions in O.R.C. § 5739.02 would generally fall within the definition of a taxable sale, but they
are specifically exempted from the tax. See OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5739.02(B) (LexisNexis
1999). Compare O.R.C. § 5739.02(B) which begins, "The tax does not apply to the following,"
with O.R.C. § 5739.01(E)(1) which states, "'Retail sale' and 'sales at retail' include all sales, except
those in which the purpose of the consumer is to... OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. §§ 5739.02(B) and
5739.01 (E)(1) (LexisNexis 1999).
17. See supra note 16. Because it would be fairly impractical, and unlikely, for a consumer of
services to resell the actual service provided, O.R.C. § 5739.01(E)(1) makes clear that, while the
resale exception applies to a sale of tangible personal property only if the actual property is resold in
the same form, by the original purchaser, the resale exception applies to sales of services as long as
the benefit of that service is resold in the same form in which it was received. Id. This important
distinction was all but ignored by the Ohio Supreme Court in Crew 4 You. See infra Part IV.
18. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5739.01(B)(3)(k) (LexisNexis 1999). Employment services
have been subject to sales tax in Ohio since 1993. H.B. 904, 119th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio
1993). The fact that employment services are subject to sales tax is mentioned here because the
Supreme Court determined that the service provided by Crew 4 You was a taxable employment
service. Crew 4 You, Inc. v. Wilkins, 105 Ohio St. 3d 356, 362 (2005). This article thus focuses on
the resale exception in the context of services and not in the context of tangible personal property.
19. During the audit period, O.R.C. § 5739.01(JJ) provided:
(JJ) "Employment Service" means providing or supplying personnel, on a temporary or
long-term basis, to perform work or labor under the supervision or control of another,
when the personnel so supplied receive their wages, salary, or other compensation from
the provider of the service. "Employment service" does not include:
(1) Acting as a contractor or subcontractor, where the personnel performing the work are
not under the direct control of the purchaser.
(2) Medical and health care services.
(3) Supplying personnel to a purchaser pursuant to a contract of at least one year
between the service provider and the purchaser that specifies that each employee covered
20071
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hallmark cases in which the Ohio Supreme Court decided whether the
sale of a service qualified for the resale exception. While not all of these
cases involve the sale of employment services, they are nevertheless
important because they demonstrate how the Court has applied the resale
exception to services, particularly the requirement that the "benefit of
the service" be resold. Ultimately, the critical component of these cases
is the Court's definition of the "benefit" of the various services at issue.
B. Cases Applying the Resale Exception to Services
Several important decisions by the Ohio Supreme Court demarcate
the bounds of the resale exception in the context of services. Analyzing
and understanding the reasoning in these cases will aid in understanding
the limits and boundaries of the resale exception and how the Court's
reasoning in Crew 4 You was flawed.
In CCH Computax, Inc. v. Tracy (1993),20 the taxpayer provided
taxable automatic data processing services to professional tax
21preparers. In a typical transaction, the tax preparers, lawyers, and
accountants whose clients were primarily individual taxpayers,
submitted their clients' tax information to CCH Computax CCH
Computax translated that information into computer language so that it
could be mechanically sorted.23  With the mechanically sorted
information, CCH Computax was able to prepare tax returns and related
schedules for the tax preparers, who signed the returns and sold them to
their customers.24
CCH Computax argued that its sales of automatic data processing
should be excepted from the sales tax levied by O.R.C. § 5739.02
because the tax preparers resold the benefit of the service (the completed
tax return) to their customers in the same form in which that benefit was
received. The BTA rejected CCH Computax's argument, reasoning
under the contract is assigned to the purchaser on a permanent basis.
(4) Transactions between members of an affiliated group, as defined in division (B)(3)(e)
of this section.
OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5739.01(JJ) (LexisNexis 1999).
20. CCH Computax, Inc. v. Tracy, 68 Ohio St. 3d 86 (1993).
21. Id. at 86. At the time of the decision in CCH Computax, O.R.C. § 5739.01(Y) defined
automatic data processing as the "processing of others' data" and "providing access to computer
equipment for the purpose of processing data or examining or acquiring data stored in or accessible
to such computer equipment." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5739.01(Y) (LexisNexis 1993).
22. CCH Computax, 68 Ohio St. 3d at 86.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 87-88.
25. Id. CCH Computax thus argued that its sales of services to the professional tax preparers
[22:169
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that the addition of the tax preparer's signature made the return more
valuable and, accordingly, the tax return was not resold by the tax
preparers "in the same form in which it was received.,
26
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed on the issue of whetherapid27 TeCutntdta C
the resale exception applied. The Court noted that CCH Computax's
professional customers transferred the completed tax returns received
from CCH Computax to their own clients and billed those clients for
CCH Computax's services as an expense.28  The Court held that the
professional tax preparer's signature on the return may have increased
the value of the return, but it did not change the "state or form of the
return., 29  Thus, the tax form, which was the benefit of CCH
Computax's service to its professional clients, was "resold" in the same
form in which it was received.30 Because the Supreme Court recognized
should be excepted from taxation because those sales qualified for the resale exception. Id. CCH
Computax alternatively argued that its sales to the tax professionals were excluded from taxation
because they were personal or professional services. Id. At the time of the Tax Commissioner's
audit of CCH Computax, O.R.C. § 5739.01(B)(5) stated, "'sale' and 'selling' do not include
professional, insurance, or personal service transactions which involve the transfer of tangible
personal property as an inconsequential element, for which no separate charges are made." OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5739.01(B)(5) (LexisNexis 1993). The BTA rejected CCH Computax's
argument, noting that whether a personal or professional service is provided is dependent upon the
consequentiality of the property transferred. CCH Computax, Inc. v. Limbach, No. 88-D-566, 1992
Ohio Tax LEXIS 727, at *9-12 (Ohio B.T.A. June 26, 1992) (citing Emery Industries, Inc. v.
Limbach, 43 Ohio St. 3d 134 (1989)). Based on Emery, the BTA found that the true object of the
transaction between CCH Computax and the tax professionals was the receipt of automatic data
processing, and not the receipt of a professional service. Id. at *11-12. The Supreme Court
affirmed the BTA's decision on this issue without discussion. CCH Computax, 68 Ohio St. 3d at
87-88.
26. CCH Computax, 1992 Ohio Tax LEXIS 727, at * 13. The BTA specifically stated that, "A
tax return properly bearing the signature of a preparer and one that does not, significantly differ as a
matter of fact and law." Id.
27. CCH Computax, 68 Ohio St. 3d at 88.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. It is important to note here that transactions between the tax professionals and their
clients were not subject to sales tax. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5739.01(Y)(2) (LexisNexis 1993).
At the time CCH Computax was decided, O.R.C. § 5739.01(Y)(2) defined as a personal or
professional service "accounting and legal services" and "any other situation where the service
provider receives data or information and studies, alters, analyzes, interprets or adjusts [it]." Id.
The issue was not argued or expressly addressed, but the Court in CCH Computax did not require or
analyze the possible necessity of a taxable transaction between the professional tax preparers and
their clients in order for the transaction between CCH Computax and its professional clients to be
eligible for the resale exception. See CCH Computax, 68 Ohio St. 3d 86. This is significant
because, as will be discussed below, in Crew 4 You, the Tax Commissioner vehemently argued for a
requirement that the second transaction in a two-transaction chain be taxable before the first
transaction can qualify for the resale exception. See Initial Merit Brief of Appellant/Cross-
Appellee, Crew 4 You, Inc. v. Zaino, 105 Ohio St. 3d 356 (2005) (No. 03-1960); see also infra note
168 and accompanying text (discussing and evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the
2007]
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that the proper analysis focuses on whether the benefit of a service is
resold in the same form, and not on the relative values of that benefit at
each stage of the transactional chain, the Court held that the BTA's
decision was "unreasonable and unlawful." 3'
In Hyatt Corp. v. Limbach (1994),32 a hotel made several purchases
of linen cleaning services without paying sales tax thereon. 33  The
taxpayer argued that the benefit of the linen cleaning service was clean
linens and that, when it leased a room, it was transferring that benefit to
its customers.34 The Court first concluded that when a hotel leases a
room to a transient guest, it transfers a license to use all tangible
personal property in the room.35 The Court thus unanimously concluded
that Hyatt resold the benefit of the linen cleaning service to its transient
customer.36
Commissioner's argument on this point).
31. CCH Computax, 68 Ohio St. 3d at 88. In reviewing a decision of the Board of Tax
Appeals, the Supreme Court must determine whether the decision is "reasonable and lawful."
Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino, 90 Ohio St. 3d 496, 497 (2001). The Court held
the BTA's decision unreasonable because it did not apply the language of the statute when
analyzing CCH Computax's resale exception argument. CCH Computax, 68 Ohio St. 3d at 88.
That is, instead of analyzing whether the professional tax preparers resold the benefit of the service
provided by CCH Computax in the same form, the BTA looked only at whether the tax returns
supplied by CCH Computax to the tax preparers were less valuable than the tax returns the tax
preparers supplied to their clients. CCH Computax, 1992 Ohio Tax LEXIS 727, at *12-13 ("The
printed materials supplied by Computax to its customers are not resold in the same form as received
by Computax's customer .. "). The Supreme Court recognized that, because the transaction
between CCH Computax and the tax preparers was a service and not a sale of tangible personal
property, the proper analysis should have focused on whether the benefit of that service was resold
in the same form, not on whether the tax preparers signature added value to the return. CCH
Computax, 68 Ohio St. 3d at 88. Because the tax preparers resold the benefit of the automatic data
processing service (the completed tax return) to its customers, the resale exception applied. Id.
Critical to this conclusion was the Court's definition of the benefit of the automatic data processing
service as the completed tax return.
32. Hyatt Corp. v. Limbach, 69 Ohio St. 3d 537 (1994).
33. Id. at 540. During the audit period, the purchase of industrial linen cleaning services was
a taxable transaction. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5739.01(B)(3)(d) (LexisNexis 1993).
34. Hyatt, 69 Ohio St. 3d at 540. Hyatt thus argued that its purchase of the generally taxable
industrial cleaning service should be excepted from sales tax under the resale exception of O.R.C.
§ 5739.01(E)(1). Id.
35. Id. The Court specifically noted:
The items of tangible personal property which are in the sleeping room for the use and
consumption of the guest are therefore clearly items of tangible personal property which
are being resold to the guest, by way of rental, in the same form in which the items were
purchased by the hotel.
Id. (quoting Hilton Hotels Corp., d.b.a. The Netherlands Hilton Hotel v. Bowers, No. 48023 (Ohio
B.T.A. July 31, 1962)).
36. Id. The Court stated:
In a lodging transaction, the hotel transfers a full sleeping room to its guest. This
transfer includes the use of linens to sleep on and to wash with. The twist in the instant
[22:169
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The Court then, surprisingly, and without providing any supporting
authority, held that when Hyatt rented rooms to customers who stayed
for longer than thirty days, it did not resell the benefit of the clean linens
because such a long-term rental is not considered a "sale" for the
purposes of the sales tax statutes.37 The Court used only two sentences
to dispose of this portion of the case.38
In Bellemar Parts Industries, Inc. v. Tracy (2000), 39 the Supreme
Court was confronted for the first time with a resale exception argument
in an employment services case. Bellemar Parts Industries, Inc.
("Bellemar") operated a wheel manufacturing and assembly line.40  To
assist in production, Bellemar contracted with an employment services
provider.41  The temporary employees performed the assembly of the
component parts and Bellemar sold the completed wheels to its
case is that Hyatt paid another entity to launder these linens, and Hyatt now claims that it
resells the benefit of this service to its guests. Under the resale exception, Hyatt is
correct. Hyatt purchased this service, normally a taxable transaction, and its guests
received the benefit of this service in being able to use clean linen.
Id. For this proposition, the Court cited, with approval, CCH Computax, 68 Ohio St.3d 86.
37. Hyatt, 69 Ohio St. 3d at 540.
38. Id. The Court stated:
Under the statutes, renting these rooms [for more than thirty days] is not a sale because
lodging is not sold to a transient guest, and, consequently, the cleaning service is not
resold. Accordingly, this linen cleaning transaction [those transactions relating to the
renting of a room to a non-transient customer] is not excepted.
Id. (explanation added). Note that in allowing the exception in the case of short-term rentals, the
Court analyzed whether the benefit of the linen cleaning service passed through to Hyatt's
customers, and concluded that it did. See supra note 36. However, once the Court pointed out that
the rental of a room to guests for longer than thirty days is not a taxable service, it simply concluded
that the linen cleaning service was not resold. Hyatt, 69 Ohio St. 3d at 540 ("[C]onsequently, the
cleaning service is not resold."). The Court thus interpreted the requirement that the benefit of a
service be "resold" as requiring that the second transaction be a "sale" as defined in the sales tax
statutes (i.e., that the transaction be a specifically enumerated taxable service). This added
requirement is both contrary to the statutory language (which does not expressly require that the
transaction between the intermediary and the final consumer be taxable) and the Court's own
holding in CCH Computax (where the transaction between the intermediary and the final consumer
was not taxable, but the resale exception nevertheless applied). See supra note 30. The Court's
interpretation also violated the longstanding principle that the taxing statutes are to be construed
strictly in favor of the taxpayer and against the taxing authorities. See Clark Restaurant Co. v.
Evatt, 146 Ohio St. 86, 91 (1945) ("[I]n the construction and application of taxing statutes their
provisions cannot be extended beyond the clear import of the language used; nor can their operation
be so enlarged as to embrace subjects not specifically enumerated.").
39. Bellemar Parts Industries, Inc. v. Tracy, 88 Ohio St. 3d 351 (2000).
40. Id. at 351. Bellemar purchased from various suppliers the component parts of its
completed wheel assemblies, including tires, wheel weights, valve stems, rim covers and rims. Id.
Bellemar then assembled the component parts and sold the completed wheel assembly to its
customers. Id.
41. Id. Adia Temporary Services and Interim Personnel supplied Bellemar with temporary
employees to help assemble the components of the wheel assembly. Id.
2007]
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customers.42 Bellemar argued that the resale exception applied to its
purchase of employment services because it resold to its customers the
benefit of the employment service in the same form as it was received.43
In making this argument, Bellemar contended that the benefit it received
from the employment service provider was the completed wheel
assembly.
44
The Tax Commissioner, on the other hand, argued that the benefit
received by Bellemar was a "flexible, less costly and more efficient
work force." 45 The Court agreed with the Tax Commissioner and held
that Bellemar did not resell the benefit of the service in the same form in
which it was received.46 The Court noted that when a consumer
42. Id. Bellemar and the Tax Commissioner agreed that the service provided by Adia was an
employment service. Id.
43. Id. at 352.
44. Id. at 352-53. This argument would seem reasonable in light of the Court's holdings in
Hyatt and CCH Computax where, in each case, the Court deemed the benefit of the services being
provided as the end-product of the service. See infra Part IV.A.I (discussing the Tax
Commissioner's concern that the resale exception would substantially eliminate the tax revenue
attributable to employment services, and noting that this concern may have been a factor in the
Court's restrictive definition of the "benefit" of an employment service relative to the
characterization of the "benefit" of other services).
45. Bellemar Parts, 88 Ohio St. 3d at 353. The Tax Commissioner further argued that, if the
benefit of the employment service was so construed, Bellemar could not be said to have resold the
benefit in the same form in which it was received. Id. Rather, Bellemar received the benefit of the
service, the flexible work force, and combined it with raw materials to create the tangible item sold.
Id. The Tax Commissioner further argued that if the resale exception was upheld in Bellemar, the
state would lose more than $40 million in tax revenues generated by employment services. Brief of
Appellant/Cross-Appellee at 18, Bellemar Parts, Inc. v. Tracy, 88 Ohio St. 3d 351 (2000) (No. 98-
2516). The Commissioner was effectively arguing that if the resale exception applied to
employment services, the tax on employment services would be substantially undermined. Id. at 18.
("It simply makes no sense that the General Assembly would enact a tax on a particular service that
would be effectively negated by the resale exception."); see also infra Part IV.A.I (more fully
discussing the Tax Commissioner's concerns on this point and how those concerns may have
contributed to the Court's reasoning in Crew 4 You). Bellemar, on the other hand, argued that "[a]
decision in favor of [Bellemar] will not destroy the tax on employment services. Employment
services will remain subject to tax in every context provided a specific tax exception does not apply.
It is illogical to argue otherwise." Reply Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant Regarding Cross-
Appeal at 18, Bellemar Parts, Inc. v. Tracy, 88 Ohio St. 3d 351 (2000) (No. 98-2516). Bellemar
further noted that in "CCH Computax, this Court excepted ADP services from the tax pursuant to
the resale exception. However, CCH Computax has not destroyed the tax on ADP services.
Similarly, in Hyatt, this Court excepted laundry services from tax pursuant to the resale tax
exception. Nevertheless, Hyatt has not destroyed the tax on laundry services." Id. at 19.
46. Bellemar Parts, 88 Ohio St. 3d at 353. The Court did not address the Tax
Commissioner's argument that the tax on employment services would be eliminated if the resale
exception was applicable to employment services. In fact, the Court noted that the resale exception
remained available to employment service providers as long as the statutory requirements thereof
are satisfied. See id. at 354 ("Nor does our holding today eliminate the resale exception's
application to services. The exception remains applicable to all services where the necessary
statutory conditions are met.").
[22:169
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contracts for temporary employees, the benefit of that service is the
actual labor of the employees and not the end-product of their work.47
Using its newly created definition of the benefit of an employment
service, the Court held that Bellemar did not resell that benefit.48  In
Bellemar, the Court did not expressly foreclose the possibility of the
resale exception in the case of employment services, though it may have
intended that its decision would have that effect.
49
In Corporate Staffing Resources, Inc. v. Zaino (2002),50 another
employment service/resale exception case, a computer hardware
provider ("Sarcom") hired temporary workers through Corporate
Staffing Resources ("CSR").51  Sarcom contracted to provide
maintenance, repair, and technology services for its customers' computer
equipment.5 2  Sarcom often hired CSR's technicians when it could not
47. Id. at 354. The Court created a new standard when it held that the benefit of employment
services is the labor of the employees and not their finished product. Id. The Court recognized the
proper standard in a resale exception case involving otherwise taxable services, and it defended its
definition of the benefit of an employment service as consistent with that standard. Id. at 353-54.
Thus:
[W]e agree with [Bellemar] that the General Assembly included the term "benefit" to
distinguish between the service purchased and the benefit received. It sought to clarify
that if a service such as landscaping is purchased, the taxpayer need not resell
landscaping services to meet the exception, but need only resell the benefit of those
services, i.e., cared-for grounds. But that distinction does not necessitate that the
"benefit" of employment services be interpreted as the final product ultimately produced
with temporary labor. Rather, our characterization of the actual benefit of employment
services as the benefit inherent in the labor itself is fully consistent with the distinction
created by the General Assembly.
Id.
48. Id. This was so because Bellemar did not resell the labor of the employees; Bellemar
resold the end-product of the labor provided by the temporary employees (the finished wheel
assembly). Id. at 351.
49. See id at 354. The Court recognized as alive and well the statutory test for the resale
exception as it applies to services when it stated, "[Bellemar's] purchase of employment service
would be excluded from tax only if [Bellemar's] purpose, as consumer of the employment services,
was to resell the benefit of the employment services to its customers in the same form as [Bellemar]
received it." Id. at 352 (emphasis in original omitted). As discussed below, while the Court did not
expressly preclude the applicability of the resale exception to the sale of employment services, its
narrow definition of the "benefit of the service provided" in an employment service transaction (the
labor of the employees) may very well have been intended to eliminate the resale exception in the
context of employment services. See infra Part IV.B. 1 (discussing the possible factors that may
have led the Court to so narrowly define the benefit of an employment service in Bellemar); see also
infra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility that Bellemar was intended to
implicitly eliminate the resale exception in most, if not all, employment service cases).
50. Corporate Staffing Resources, Inc. v. Zaino, 95 Ohio St. 3d 1 (2002).
51. Id. at 1.
52. Id. The technology services included system design and implementation, PC systems
integration, educational and help-desk services, and hardware repair. Brief of Appellant at 6,
Corporate Staffing Resources v. Zaino, 95 Ohio St. 3d 1 (2002) (No. 2000-2127). Sarcom
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meet its demand. 53
CSR argued that its sales of employment services to Sarcom
qualified for the resale exception because Sarcom resold the benefit of
the service provided by CSR to its customers in the same form in which
it was received. 54  The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the benefit
Sarcom provided to its customers was keeping the customers' computer
systems functioning, while the benefit received by Sarcom was a
temporary and flexible workforce. 55 The Court relied on Bellemar in
reaching its holding.56
As noted above, the Court has never expressly declared that the
resale exception cannot apply to a sale of an employment service, but by
limiting the definition of the benefit of an employment service to a
flexible, less costly work force, the Supreme Court seemingly attempted
to do so. 7  In Crew 4 You, Inc. v. Wilkins,58 the Court finished what it
had begun in Bellemar-it eliminated once and for all any chance that
the resale exception could apply to a sale of employment services.5 9 In
estimated the cost for providing such services and negotiated a contract with its customers. Id.
Sarcom then entered into a contract with its customers to provide technicians who would provide
the contracted for services. Id.
53. Corporate Staffing Resources, 95 Ohio St. 3d at 1. According to CSR, "CSR technicians
were deployed in the same manner as Sarcom technicians, and Sarcom's commitment to its
customer was unchanged with respect to which technicians performed the services." Brief of
Appellant, supra note 52, at 8.
54. Corporate Staffing Resources, 95 Ohio St. 3d at 2. Specifically, Corporate Staffing
Resources argued, "[t]he labor benefit of employment services is resold in the same form when a
business contracts to receive employment services and deploys the temporary employees directly to
its customers' business sites to perform services on its customers' equipment under the on-site
supervision of its customer employees." Brief of Appellant, supra note 52, at 10.
55. Corporate Staffing Resources, 95 Ohio St. 3d at 3. The Court properly applied the resale
exception because it focused on the benefit received at each step in the transaction chain. See supra
note 16 (quoting in full the statutory text of the resale exception).
56. Corporate Staffing Resources, 95 Ohio St. 3d at 3-5. The Court referred to the standard
announced in Bellemar as the "actual benefit" inquiry. Id. at 3. Using that standard, the Court
found that "the actual benefit to Sarcom was not the product of the workers' labor--consistently
operating computer hardware-but a temporary and flexible work force of sufficient size and
expertise." Id. at 3 (emphasis in original). The Court found that this benefit contrasted with the
benefit sought and received by Sarcom's customers-functioning computers. Id. It is important to
note that in this case, the Court did not state that Bellemar stood for the proposition that the resale
exception does not apply to employment services. See id. at 1. Rather, the Court stated, "[b]ecause
we conclude that the company does not resell the benefit obtained from the temporary employment
service in the same form in which it was received, we hold the resale exception inapplicable." Id.
57. As discussed below, while the Court may have intended to eliminate the resale exception
in the context of employment services by so narrowly defining the benefit of such service, a factual
distinction in Crew 4 You created a reasonable argument that the benefit of an employment service
could be resold, even under the Court's narrow definition that benefit. See infra Part IV.B.3.
58. Crew 4 You, Inc. v. Wilkins, 105 Ohio St. 3d 356 (2005).
59. See infra Part IV.B. As discussed below, the Court ignored the factual nuances presented
[22:169
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doing so, the Court created confusion and uncertainty for all service
providers.6°
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of the Facts
During the audit period of September 1, 1996 through December
31, 1999, Crew 4 You provided personnel services to "trucking"
companies, who in turn contracted with out-of-town broadcasting
entities covering sporting events in Northeast Ohio.61 When an out-of-
town sports team competes in Northeast Ohio, the out-of-town TV
station that owns the broadcast rights for the sporting event generally
sends to the event only its on-air announcer(s), a producer, and a
director.62 The remaining personnel and equipment necessary to create
the live broadcast for out-of-town viewing is provided by a local
"trucking" company.63 The trucking company then retains a company
that has access to trained personnel capable of operating its equipment-
64
a "crewing" company. As one such crewing company, Crew 4 You
supplied crewing services, for a charge, to the trucking companies.65
Crew 4 You did not collect Ohio sales tax on its sales of services to
the trucking companies.66 The Tax Commissioner of Ohio assessed
in Crew 4 You, misapplied the resale exception test in the context of services, and mischaracterized
its precedent seemingly in an effort to definitively preclude the use of the resale exception in the
context of employment services. Id.
60. See infra Part IV.C.1. The Court added confusion because of the manner in which it
misapplied the resale exception statute. Id. As detailed below, by blurring the distinction between
tangible personal property and services for purposes of applying the resale exception (that is, by
deeming the resale exception applicable to "employment services" only if "employment services"
are resold), the Court left open the question of how it will treat services in future cases involving the
resale exception. Id. Will it apply the resale exception test consistently with its past precedent (by
inquiring into the benefit provided by the service), or will it use the fractured reasoning it used in
Crew 4 You (by inquiring into whether the actual service is resold)? See id. The Court left these
questions open because it did not announce that it was applying a new resale exception test
(presumably because such an announcement would run counter to statutory language and legislative
intent). Id. Instead, the Court simply misapplied the statute as if it were doing so consistent with its
precedent. See id.
61. Crew 4 You, Inc. v. Zaino, No. 2002-V-958, 2003 Ohio Tax LEXIS 1505, at *2 (Ohio
B.T.A. Oct. 24, 2003).
62. Id.
63. Id. The trucking company owns and provides all the cameras, microphones, productions
trucks, and related equipment necessary to produce a live broadcast. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Final Determination of Tax Commissioner, Assessment No. 8000405434 (June 6, 2002) at
20071
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Crew 4 You's sales of personnel services to the trucking companies
under O.R.C. § 5739.01(B)(3)(k), contending that Crew 4 You was a
provider of employment services, as defined in O.R.C. § 5739.01(Jj). 67
B. Procedural History
The Tax Commissioner of Ohio audited Crew 4 You for the period
of September 1, 1996 through December 31, 1999.68 The result of this
audit was an assessment of $156,588.85 for unpaid taxes and fees.69
Crew 4 You objected and filed a petition for reassessment.7 °
1. The Tax Commissioner's Final Determination
In its petition for reassessment, Crew 4 You first argued that it did
not provide employment services because the personnel at issue were not
supervised or controlled by the purchaser of the services.71 Crew 4 You
argued, in the alternative, that if it did provide employment services, its
sales of those services were excepted from sales tax under the resale
exception in O.R.C. § 5739.01(E)(1). 72  Crew 4 You argued that the
benefit of its service was the contribution of temporary, flexible, and less
costly services and that the trucking companies resold that benefit to the
broadcasting entities.73
The Tax Commissioner determined that Crew 4 You did in fact
provide employment services and rejected Crew 4 You's resale
exception argument.74  The Commissioner argued that, pursuant to the
actual benefit inquiry, the trucking companies did not resell the actual
benefit of the service provided by Crew 4 You. 75 Relying on the Ohio
6.
67. Id. Recall that O.R.C. § 5739.01(B)(3)(k) dictates that sales of employment services are
taxable and O.R.C. § 5739.01(JJ) contains the definition of an employment service. See OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § § 5739.01 (B)(3)(k), (JJ) (LexisNexis 1999).
68. Final Determination of Tax Commissioner at 1.
69. Id. This assessment included not only the sales tax the Commissioner contended Crew 4
You should have collected on its sales of employment services, but also over $30,000 in additional
charges, penalties and interest. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. Crew 4 You thus claimed that its personnel were independent contractors and fit the
statutory exemption from employment services under O.R.C. § 5739.01(JJ)(1). The merits and
relative strengths and weaknesses of this argument are not addressed herein because the focus of
this Note is the Supreme Court's disposition of the case on resale exception grounds.
72. Id. at 4.
73. Final Determination of Tax Commissioner at 5.
74. Id.
75. Id. Specifically, the Tax Commissioner argued:
The mobile production companies do not resell employment services; the mobile
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Supreme Court's decision in Corporate Staffing Resources, Inc. v.
Zaino, the Commissioner asserted that the benefit received by the
trucking companies was the labor of Crew 4 You's technicians.76 The
benefit sold by the trucking companies to the broadcasting entities,
according to the Commissioner, only included the end-product of that
labor and not the labor itself.
77
Crew 4 You filed a notice of appeal with the Ohio BTA.78
2. The BTA
At the BTA, Crew 4 You again argued that the trucking companies
resold the benefit of the employment services to the broadcasting entities
in the same form in which those services were received.79 Crew 4 You
production companies use the employment services to fill their vacant positions with
temporary employees. Without the additional technical personnel, the mobile production
companies would be unable to provide broadcast production services to the broadcasting
entities. Their cameras would not be manned and no one would be there to operate the
audio equipment and the other technologically advanced equipment essential to the
production of a broadcast.
Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. Specifically, the Tax Commissioner argued that the benefit received by the trucking
companies was the ability to fill their vacant positions with temporary labor. Id. The benefit
provided to the broadcast entities, on the other hand, was the end-product of the crewing company's
employees' labor-staffed equipment ready for use in broadcasting a live sporting event. Id.
78. Crew 4 You, Inc. v. Zaino, No. 2002-V-958, 2003 Ohio Tax LEXIS 1505, at *1 (Ohio
B.T.A. Oct. 24, 2003). Pursuant to O.R.C. § 5717.02, appeals of a final determination of the Tax
Commissioner may be taken to the BTA. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5717.02 (LexisNexis 2005).
Such appeals may be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the BTA and with the Tax
Commissioner. Id. See Clippard Instrument Laboratory, Inc. v. Lindley, 50 Ohio St. 2d 121 (1977)
(holding that the BTA lacks jurisdiction to hear an appeal if notice of the appeal is not sent to the
Tax Commissioner). The notice of appeal must be filed within sixty days of the service of the final
determination, must be attached to a copy of the Tax Commissioner's final determination, and must
specify the alleged errors contained therein. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5717.02 (LexisNexis 2005).
The Tax Commissioner then certifies to the BTA a record of any proceedings that have occurred
and all evidence considered by the Tax Commissioner. Id. An evidentiary hearing then takes place
before an attorney examiner. Id. See also OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5717-1-15 (Anderson 2005). The
BTA has no jurisdiction to determine an issue not presented in the notice of appeal. See Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Wilkins, 102 Ohio St. 3d 33 (2004). Additionally, the alleged error must be stated
with sufficient specificity to apprise the Board of the nature and extent of the error. See General
Mills, Inc. v. Limbach, 63 Ohio St. 3d 273 (1992); Ne. Ohio Reg'l Sewer Dist. v. Limbach, 72 Ohio
App. 3d 540 (1991).
79. Crew 4 You, 2003 Ohio Tax LEXIS 1505, at *13. As support for its argument, Crew 4
You offered sixteen letters of usage submitted by customers of Crew 4 You. Id. at * 13 n.4. The
letters were statements by Crew 4 You's customers indicating that they resold the benefit of the
service provided by Crew 4 You in the same form in which it was received to various broadcasting
entities. Id. The Board of Tax Appeals noted that the letters carried little weight, but that they were
amplified by testimony given at the hearing before the Board. Id.
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argued that the benefit of the service it provided to the trucking
companies was a flexible and skilled workforce and that this benefit was
passed through the trucking companies to the broadcasting entities.
80
While the BTA found that Crew 4 You sold employment services,
it accepted Crew 4 You's resale exception argument, distinguishing the
Ohio Supreme Court's decisions in Corporate Staffing Resources and
Bellemar.81 The Board unanimously concluded that the benefit of Crew
4 You's personnel services was a flexible workforce of qualified
technicians, a benefit that was passed through the trucking company to
the broadcasting entity.82 The transactions between Crew 4 You and the
trucking companies were thus entitled to the resale exception.
83
3. The Ohio Supreme Court
84
The Tax Commissioner appealed the BTA's decision and, having
85lost on resale exception grounds, changed his arguments. The
Commissioner now conceded that the benefit of the employment service
passed through the trucking company to the broadcast entity.86  The
Commissioner contended, however, that the resale exception did not
80. Post Hearing Brief of Appellant at 12, Crew 4 You, Inc. v. Zaino, 2003 Ohio Tax LEXIS
1505 (Ohio B.T.A. Oct. 24,2003).
81. Crew 4 You, 2003 Ohio Tax LEXIS 1505, at * 17-18. The BTA stated:
In Bellemar, the benefit derived from the employment services was used by the
taxpayers in the creation of its tangible product. In Corporate Staffing Resources, the
benefit derived was not consistent throughout the transactional chain. Here, the benefit
received at each step in the transactional chain was the same. The benefit of Crew 4
You's personnel services (a flexible, temporary workforce) is passed on through the
trucking company to the broadcast entity.
Id. at *18.
82. Id. at * 17-18. The BTA noted that a flexible workforce of qualified technicians to operate
the trucking company's equipment was necessary in order for the broadcasting entity to air a live
broadcast of a local sporting event. Id. at* 17.
83. Id.at*18-19.
84. A taxpayer may appeal a decision of the BTA directly to the Ohio Supreme Court or to
the Court of Appeals where the property taxed is situated or where the taxpayer resides. OHIO REV.
CODE. ANN. § 5717.04 (LexisNexis 2005). Either the Tax Commissioner or the taxpayer may
appeal. Id. The appeal must be filed within thirty days after the date of the entry of the decision of
the BTA on the journal of its proceedings. Id. The appeal must be filed with the Court in which the
matter was appealed to and to the BTA. Id. The appeal must set forth the decision of the BTA
appealed from and the alleged errors contained therein. Id.
85. See Initial Merit Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee, Crew 4 You, Inc. v. Zaino, 105 Ohio
St. 3d 356 (2005) (No. 03-1960).
86. Id. at 3. According to the Tax Commissioner, "Unlike [Corporate Staffing Resources and
Bellemar], the evidence here strongly indicates the benefit of the employment service provided to
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apply because Crew 4 You failed to provide evidence that the
transaction between the trucking companies and the broadcasting entities
was a "sale" for the purposes of the Ohio sales and use tax.
87
The Commissioner specifically argued that, because the
transactions between the trucking companies and the broadcasting
entities were not taxable, the initial transactions between Crew 4 You
and the trucking company could not qualify for the resale exception.88
The Commissioner's final point was that, because the transaction
between the trucking companies and the broadcasting entities could not
be characterized as a sale of employment services, the resale exception
could not apply.89
Crew 4 You argued that the record supported a finding that the
trucking companies did "resell" the benefit of the crewing services and
that the resale exception should apply.90 Crew 4 You further argued that
the Commissioner's argument on this point was inconsistent because the
Commissioner conceded, based on the letters of usage and the
amplifying testimony, that the benefit of the crewing services passed
through to the trucking companies to the broadcasting entities, while at
the same time arguing that Crew 4 You presented no evidence that the
87. Id. at 2-3. The Tax Commissioner noted, "Although the BTA's premise that the benefit of
the employment service 'passed through the trucking company to the broadcast entity' is supported
by the evidence in this case, its conclusion that there was a resale of employment services is
mistaken." Id. at 2. Interestingly, the BTA did not conclude that there was a "resale of employment
services." See Crew 4 You, 2003 Ohio Tax LEXIS 1505; see also supra notes 81-83 and
accompanying text. The BTA simply concluded that, pursuant to statutory language, Crew 4 You
was entitled to the resale exception. Crew 4 You, 2003 Ohio Tax LEXIS 1505, at *18-19. Despite
the Tax Commissioner's assertion, the BTA correctly avoided analyzing whether the trucking
companies resold "employment services." See infra note 136 and accompanying text (further
discussing the BTA's analysis). Rather, the BTA, following the statutory language, focused on
whether the benefit of the personnel service provided by Crew 4 You was resold in the same form
by the trucking companies. Id. Nevertheless, the Commissioner attempted to create an additional
requirement to the resale exception-proof that the sale between the intermediary and the final
consumer was taxable. Initial Merit Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee, supra note 85, at 4.
88. Initial Merit Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee, supra note 85, at 14. The Commissioner
argued that the underlying goal of the resale exception is to tax the final transaction in a
transactional chain. Id. at 10-11. The Commissioner recognized that his starting premise was
"largely implicit in the caselaw." Id. at 10.
89. Id. at 18. In the final paragraph of his initial merit brief, the Commissioner asserted,
"Since the trucking companies could not be found to be selling employment services, it follows by
iron force of logic that they did not resell the service they purchased from Crew 4 You." Id. As
mentioned, the fact that the trucking companies did not sell "employment services" is irrelevant to
the inquiry of whether the transaction between Crew 4 You and the trucking companies qualified for
the resale exception. See supra note 16 (quoting in full the statutory resale exception language); see
also infra Parts IV.B.I, IV.B.2.
90. Second Merit Brief (Reply Merit Brief of Appellee and Brief in Support of Cross-Appeal
by Crew 4 You, Inc.) at 4, Crew 4 You, Inc., v. Zaino, 105 Ohio St. 3d 356 (2005) (No. 03-1960).
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trucking companies "resold" the benefit of the crewing services.91
Crew 4 You alternatively argued against imposing a requirement
that the final sale in a transactional chain be a taxable sale92 and asserted
that the plain language of the statute creates no such requirement and
that such a requirement should not be judicially created.93
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed and held that
the resale exception did not apply.94  The Ohio Supreme Court agreed
with the Commissioner that, because the trucking companies did not
resell employment services, the resale exception could not apply.95 The
91. Id. at 3-4. Crew 4 You specifically noted that, in making his concession that the benefit
of the employment service passed through to the broadcasting entities, the Commissioner stated that
the exhibits and testimony at the BTA hearing provided strong support for the passing of the benefit.
Id. at 4 n.5. Crew 4 You characterized as disingenuous the Commissioner's subsequent attempt to
minimize the impact of that evidence for the purpose of determining whether the trucking
companies "resold" the benefit of the crewing services to the broadcasting entities. Id. at 3.
92. Id. at 4-6. For the proposition that the final sale in the transaction must be taxable, the
Commissioner relied heavily on Hyatt Corp. v. Limbach, 69 Ohio St. 3d 537 (1994), a case,
discussed above, in which a hotel purchased linen cleaning services without paying sales tax on
those purchases. Hyatt, 69 Ohio St. 3d at 540. In Hyatt, the Court concluded that Hyatt resold the
benefit of the linen cleaning service to its customers who stayed for less than thirty days because a
sale to such a customer was taxable. Id. Sales to guests who stayed long term were not taxable, and
the resale exception did not apply. Id. Crew 4 You argued that the Commissioner misinterpreted
Hyatt, particularly in light of several other resale exception cases. Second Merit Brief, supra note
90, at 6-8. For the proposition that the final sale in the transactional chain need not be taxable for
the resale exception to apply, Crew 4 You cited G & J Pepsi Cola Bottling, Inc. v. Limbach, 48
Ohio St. 3d 31 (1990) (resale exception applied to a wholesaler's purchase of equipment where the
wholesaler transferred the equipment to retailers rent free because the retailers assumed liability in
the event of damage or destruction of the equipment-consideration thus existed for the transfer of
the equipment from the wholesalers to the retailers, though the transfer was not subject to sales tax),
and CCH Computax, Inc. v. Tracy, 68 Ohio St. 3d 86 (resale exception applied to the purchase of
automatic data processing services where the purchaser of those services transferred the benefit of
that service to its customers, even though the service provided by the purchaser of the data
processing services to its customers was not subject to sales tax). Id. at 5-6.
93. Second Merit Brief, supra note 90, at 8. The BTA agreed with Crew 4 You and focused
not on the label given to the transaction between the trucking companies and the broadcasting
entities, but on whether the benefit provided by Crew 4 You passed to the broadcasting entities
through the trucking companies. See supra note 81 (discussing the BTA's analysis); see also supra
note 16 (quoting in full the statutory language).
94. Crew 4 You, Inc. v. Wilkins, 105 Ohio St. 3d 356, 365 (2005).
95. Id. at 363. The Court reasoned that either the trucking companies or Crew 4 You was
responsible for sales tax on the "employment services." Id. ("[T]he critical question is whether
Crew 4 You owes the sales tax or whether instead the trucking companies owe the sales tax on the
sale of the employment services that Crew 4 You provided."). The Court then stated, "Under the
R.C. 5739.01(E) resale exception, the trucking companies owe the sales tax if they bought the
services but then resold them in the same form to the broadcasting entities. Otherwise-as the Tax
Commissioner found-Crew 4 You owes the sales tax." Id. This analysis cannot be reconciled
with the statutory language which dictates that the resale exception applies to a transaction
involving services if the benefit of that service is resold. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5739.01(E)(1)
(LexisNexis 1999); see infra Part IV.B.2.
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Court additionally analyzed the elements of an employment service, as
defined in O.R.C. § 5739.0 1(JJ), 96 and concluded that the trucking
companies did not sell employment services.97  The Court then
concluded that, because the trucking companies did not sell employment
services, Crew 4 You was the only seller of such services and,
accordingly, Crew 4 You owed the sales tax on the employment
services.
98
In holding that the transactions between Crew 4 You and the
trucking companies did not qualify for the resale exception because the
trucking companies did not resell "employment services," the Court
avoided the question of whether the final sale in the transactional chain
must be taxable for the resale exception to apply. 99 The Court quite
simply held that, because the trucking companies did not sell
employment services, the resale exception could not apply.'00
The Court avoided the express language of O.R.C.
§ 5739.01(E)(1). 1° 1 It focused rigidly on the service sold by the trucking
companies to the broadcasting entities.10 2  The inquiry under O.R.C.
96. Crew 4 You, 105 Ohio St. 3d at 363. The Court stated:
A seller of an "employment service" as that term is used in Ohio pays the "wages, salary,
or other compensation" of the personnel. O.R.C. § 5739.01(JJ). The trucking companies
did not pay the personnel supplied by Crew 4 You, so those companies did not sell an
employment service. Crew 4 You was the only seller of employment services in the
three-way transaction involving Crew 4 You, the trucking companies, and the
broadcasting entities. Crew 4 You owes sales taxes on the money it earned for providing
those services.
Id. When the Court worked through the elements of an employment service to determine whether
the trucking companies sold employment services to the broadcasting entities, the Court ignored
both the statutory language of O.R.C. § 5739.01(E)(1) and its own prior directive that "the proper
inquiry is a focus on the actual benefit received and not on the service provided." Corporate
Staffing Resources, Inc. v. Zaino, 95 Ohio St. 3d 1, 4 (2002); see also infra Parts IV.B.2, IV.B.3.
97. Crew 4 You, 105 Ohio St. 3d at 363. The Court noted that "the good or service that the
trucking companies received from Crew 4 You was different from the good or service that the
broadcasting entities received from the trucking companies." Id.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 364. The Court did cite its holding in Hyatt Corp. v. Limbach, 69 Ohio St. 3d
537, (1994). Id. The Court's ultimate reason for denying the resale exception was not, however,
that the final sale from the trucking companies to the broadcasting entities was not a taxable sale.
Id. See also infra note 174 and accompanying text. As discussed above, the reason the Court
denied the resale exception was because the trucking companies did not sell employment services.
Crew 4 You, 105 Ohio St. 3d at 364.
100. Crew 4 You, 105 Ohio St. 3d at 364. The Court's ultimate reasoning is as follows: "[I]f
the trucking companies did not sell employment services at all, then they certainly did not resell
them." Id. (emphasis in original). The Court went further: "The trucking companies did not sell
employment services as those services are defined in R.C. § 5739.01(JJ), so those companies
certainly cannot be said to have resold the services purchased from Crew 4 You." Id. at 365.
101. See infra Part IV.B.2.
102. See infra Part IV.B.I.
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§ 5739.01(E)(1) is not, however, whether the same service is resold; it is
whether the benefit of that service is resold. 10 3 The Court made a critical
error, and ignored past precedent, when it held that the resale exception
did not apply because the trucking companies did not sell "employment
services."' 4  This misapplication of the statute and precedent is the
focus of the remainder of this Note.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Court's Possible Concern with Employment Services
The Tax Commissioner was concerned from the inception of the tax
on employment services that if the resale exception applied to those
services, it would substantially eliminate the revenue the tax was
expected to generate.'0 5  In Bellemar Parts Industries Inc. v. Tracy,
10 6
the Tax Commissioner argued that if the resale exception applied to
employment services, the tax on employment services would be
substantially undermined. 1
07
Though the Bellemar Court did not address the argument, it may
have been considering the Tax Commissioner's warning when it
narrowly defined the "benefit" of an employment service.' 0 8 The Court
applied this narrow interpretation to the resale exception to determine
that, where "an employer contracts for temporary employees to come
into its facility and provide labor under its direction and control, that
103. See infra Part IV.B.2.
104. See infra Parts IV.B.2 and IV.B.3.
105. See Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee at 18, Bellemar Parts, Inc. v. Tracy, 88 Ohio St. 3d
351 (2000) (No. 98-2516) where the Tax Commissioner argued that if the resale exception was
upheld in Bellemar, the state would lose $40 million in tax revenues generated by employment
services; see also supra note 45 (discussing the Tax Commissioner's arguments on this point).
106. Bellemar Parts Industries, Inc. v. Tracy, 88 Ohio St. 3d 351.
107. Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee, supra note 105, at 18, ("It simply makes no sense that
the General Assembly would enact a tax on a particular service that would be effectively negated by
the resale exception."). Bellemar, on the other hand, argued that "[a] decision in favor of
[Bellemar] will not destroy the tax on employment services. Employment services will remain
subject to tax in every context provided a specific tax exception does not apply. It is illogical to
argue otherwise." Reply Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant Regarding Cross-Appeal at 18,
Bellemar Parts, Inc. v. Tracy, 88 Ohio St. 3d 351 (2000) (No. 98-2516).
108. See Bellemar Parts, 88 Ohio St. 3d at 354, where the Court defined the benefit of an
employment service as the labor of the employees. Of course, the Court did not expressly
acknowledge the Commissioner's argument on this point, and its restrictive treatment of the resale
exception as it applies to employment services may or may not have been influenced by the Tax
Commissioner's argument. Nevertheless, this part of the Note attempts to determine why the Court
so restrictively applied the resale exception to employment services, and merely offers one
possibility for such treatment.
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'benefit' (the labor) is not resold to its customer in the same form
(labor)." 109
Other examples of the resale exception and its application to
services illuminate just how restrictively the Bellemar Court defined the
benefit of an employment service. First, the Bellemar Court described a
hypothetical service provider to acknowledge the different treatment of
services and tangible personal property for resale exception purposes.' 10
In distinguishing between services and property, the Court noted that the
General Assembly "sought to clarify that if a service such as landscaping
is purchased, the taxpayer need not resell landscaping services to meet
the exception, but need only resell the benefit of those services, i.e.,
cared-for grounds.""' Thus, the Court reasoned that the benefit
provided by a landscaping service is cared-for grounds.' 12  Stated
differently, the benefit of a landscaping service is the end-product of that
service. 113
Similarly, in Hyatt Corp. v. Limbach,1 4 the Court found that the
benefit of an industrial linen cleaning service was the end-product of that
cleaning service-clean linens. 1 5  In his Bellemar dissent, Justice
Pfeifer criticized the majority for characterizing the benefit of an
employment service as a "flexible, less costly and more efficient
109. Id. This statement encompasses most temporary employment service arrangements. As
discussed below, the Court may have thought that this interpretation of the benefit of an
employment service and its application to an employment service for resale exception purposes
effectively precluded the availability of the resale exception in the context of employment services.
See infra Part IV.B.3.
110. Bellemar Parts, 88 Ohio St. 3d at 353-54.
111. Id. at 354.
112. Id.
113. Id.; see also id. at 357 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) ("My disagreement with the majority is in
regard to the characterization of the 'benefit of the service."'). Justice Pfeifer continued, noting
that:
The only way to fairly characterize the benefit of service [sic] is to look to the finished
product, i.e., what the service yields .... The benefit alluded to by the majority, a
"flexible, less costly, and more efficient work force," is ephemeral at best. Bellemar is
not hiring temporary employees to hang around and get paid less than full-time workers.
They hire them to work. They do work. And the benefit of that work is a completed
project, which is resold.
Id.
114. Hyatt Corp. v. Limbach, 69 Ohio St. 3d 537 (1994).
115. Id. at 540. See also CCH Computax, Inc. v. Tracy, 68 Ohio St. 3d 86, 88, where the Court
accepted that the benefit of an automatic data processing service was the product of the automatic
data processing service (i.e., a completed tax return). Recall that in CCH Computax the Court held
the resale exception applicable because the professional tax preparers, who submitted their
customers' raw tax data to a data processing firm, resold the benefit of the automatic data
processing service (the completed tax return) to their customers in the same form. Id.
2007]
19
Stefanik: Crew 4 You, Inc. v. Wilkins: The Ohio Supreme Court Misapplies St
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007
AKRON TAX JOURNAL [22:169
workforce," noting the similarities between Bellemar and Hyatt. 16
Specifically, Justice Pfeifer stated:
We saw the benefit of the service in Hyatt to be simply clean linen-
we did not look to any side benefit that might inure to Hyatt. We did
not cite the economic benefit of outsourcing laundry as opposed to
having Hyatt employees do the work. The benefit of the service was
the finished product-clean laundry. Likewise, the benefit in this case
is completed wheel assemblies. Since Bellemar resells that benefit, the
temporary employment service meets the sales tax exclusion in R.C.
5739.01(E)().'' 7
What emerges from these cases is that the Court has been much
more liberal in its construction of the benefit of a service in cases where
that service is any service other than an employment service."' The
question thus becomes, why is it appropriate for the "benefit of a
service" to be the end-product of that service in every other instance but
not in the case of employment services? 19 The answer may simply be
that the Court was impressed with the Tax Commissioner's warning that
if the resale exception applied to employment services, the tax on
employment services would be eliminated. 120 It is quite possible that the
unstated reasons that may have fueled the Court's narrow construction of
the benefit provided by an employment service in Bellemar were at work
in Crew 4 You.'
2 1
B. The Court's Reasoning in Crew 4 You
1. A Preference for Form Over Substance
The Crew 4 You Court was more concerned with the label given to
116. Bellemar Parts, 88 Ohio St. 3d at 357-58 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 357-58. Thus, Justice Pfeifer recognized that the Court's interpretation of the
benefit of an employment service was unduly narrow and inconsistent with the Court's definition of
the benefit of other services. See id.
118. Note that in all of the cases described, and in the hypothetical provided by the majority in
Bellemar, the benefit of the service provided was deemed to be the end-product of that service.
119. See infra Parts IV.B.I, IV.B.4 (suggesting that the Court engaged in improper judicial
lawmaking by eliminating the resale exception in the case of employment services).
120. See Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee at 18, Bellemar Parts, Inc. v. Tracy, 88 Ohio St. 3d
351 (2000) (No. 98-2516). Whether the revenue attributable to the tax on employment services
actually would be effectively eliminated by the resale exception is not explored in this Note.
121. See infra Parts IV.B.2 and IV.B.3, which explain in detail why the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Crew 4 You cannot be reconciled with the clear statutory language in O.R.C.
§ 5739.01(E)(1) or the Court's own precedent, and which suggest that the opinion was quite
possibly the product of a result-driven analysis.
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the service provided by the trucking companies than the actual nature of
the transaction. 122 Indeed, the Court referenced, thirteen times, the fact
that the service provided by the trucking companies to the broadcasting
entities did not meet the statutory definition of an "employment
service."'12 3 Once the Court reduced its analysis to a label test (i.e., once
it limited its analysis to comparing the actual service sold at each step of
the transaction), it was easy for the Court to conclude that Crew 4 You
owed the tax on its sale of employment services because it was the only
party in the transactional chain that sold an employment service.1
2 4
The Court played a label game that is uncalled for in the statute and
122. As will be discussed, the Court violated clear statutory language when it analyzed whether
the trucking companies sold employment services, rather than analyzing whether the trucking
companies sold the benefit they received from Crew 4 You in the same form. See infra Part IV.B.2.
The Court also abandoned its own precedent. See infra Part IV.B.3. Though the Court's holding in
Bellemar was narrow indeed, it did not directly apply to the services provided by Crew 4 You
because the temporary personnel supplied by Crew 4 You did not report to the consumer's
workplace to aid in manufacturing tangible personal property for sale. See infra note 157
(discussing the factual distinctions that should have formed the basis for distinguishing Crew 4 You
from Bellemar).
123. See Crew 4 You, Inc. v. Wilkins, 105 Ohio St. 3d 356, 356-57 (2005). ("[W]e reverse the
decision of the BTA because Crew 4 You has not shown that the employment services were in fact
resold by the buyer."); id. at 362 ("As the Tax Commissioner stated in his final determination,
however, the trucking companies 'do not resell employment services."'); id. at 363 ("We agree with
the Tax Commissioner's view that the trucking companies did not resell employment
services .... "); id. ("The trucking companies did not pay the personnel supplied by Crew 4 You,
so those companies did not sell an employment service."); id. ("Crew 4 You was the only seller of
employment services in the three-way transaction involving Crew 4 You, the trucking companies,
and the broadcasting entities."); id. at 364 ("The company that did sell an 'employment service' as
that term is defined in R.C. 5739.01(JJ) was Crew 4 You .. "); id. ("Because the trucking
companies did not sell a taxable 'employment service' to the broadcasting entities-because the
provider of 'employment service' under R.C. 5739.01(JJ) must pay the 'wages, salary, or other
compensation' of the workers, and Crew 4 You (rather than the trucking companies) paid the
workers' wages-the trucking companies cannot be deemed to have resold the employment services
that they purchased from Crew 4 You."); id. ("[I]f the trucking companies did not sell employment
services at all, then they certainly did not resell them."); id. at 365 ("[Tlrucking companies did not
sell employment services as those services are defined in R.C. 5739.01(JJ), so those companies
certainly cannot be said to have resold the services purchased from Crew 4 You."); id. ("The record
indicates that crewing companies did not sell or resell employment services .... ") (Note that this
sentence contains an error or oversight, as the Court stated that the "crewing" companies did not sell
employment services. The Court clearly meant that the "trucking" companies did not sell or resell
employment services, as it had already found in its opinion that Crew 4 You did sell employment
services.); id. ("Crew 4 You was the only company that sold employment services in the three-way
transactions involving Crew 4 You, the trucking companies, and the broadcasting entities."); id.
("Crew 4 You sold employment services, but the trucking companies did not."); id ("[A]nd the
trucking companies certainly did not sell an 'employment service' as that term is defined in R.C.
5739.01(JJ).").
124. See Crew 4 You, 105 Ohio St. 3d. at 364 ("The Company that did sell an 'employment
service' . . . was Crew 4 You, and that company now owes taxes ... ").
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unprecedented in its prior decisions. 125  This analysis was inconsistent
with both clear statutory language and with the Court's own
precedent.126 Additionally, by limiting its analysis to whether the second
party in the three-party transaction actually sold employment services,
the Court permanently eliminated the availability of the resale exception
in the context of employment services. 2 7  This amounted to judicial
lawmaking and an abrogation of legislative prerogative.12 8
2. The Court Abandoned Clear Statutory Language
In rigidly focusing on the service the trucking companies
provided-and the fact that it was not an employment service-the
Court treated the employment service Crew 4 You provided as if it were
an item of tangible personal property, abandoning the express language
of the resale exception statute requiring that tangible personal property
and services be analyzed differently. 29  It makes sense, and is in fact
mandated, that in the case of tangible personal property, if the second
party to the transaction does not resell the same item of tangible personal
property in the same form, the resale exception cannot apply.'
30
125. See infra Parts IV.B.2, IV.B.3. The Court effectively stated that an employment service is
a taxable service and that somebody must pay tax on such a service. See supra notes 123-24.
126. See infra Parts IV.B.2, IV.B.3. The Court's analysis also denies the existence of a benefit
inquiry in the case of services because it treats a taxable service as taxable unconditionally, limiting
the analysis only to which party to the transaction must pay tax on the sale of the service and not on
whether one party to the transaction sold the benefit of the service to another party.
127. See OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5739.01(JJ) (LexisNexis 1999). This is so because one of
the elements of a taxable employment service is that the provider of the employment service pays
the wages of the temporary employees. Id. Thus, before Crew 4 You, or any employment service
provider, can be found to have sold an employment service, it must be found that it pays the wages
of the temporary employees. Id. Once that determination is made, it is, by default, impossible for
the purchaser of those employment services to actually resell them because that purchaser does not
pay the wages of the temporary employee. See id. Therefore, under the Court's formulation of the
test, the resale exception can never exist in the case of employment services. See id
128. See infra Part IV.B.4 (discussing the impropriety of the Court's performing a legislative
function by precluding the applicability of the resale exception to employment services).
129. See OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5739.01(E)(1) (LexisNexis 1999). Recall that during the
audit period, O.R.C. § 5739.01(E)(1) excluded from the definition of sales all sales in which the
purpose of the consumer "is to resell the thing transferred or benefit of the service provided, by a
person engaging in business, in the form in which the same is, or is to be, received by the person."
Id. (emphasis added).
130. See OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5739.01(E)(1) (LexisNexis 1999). Thus, if tangible
personal property were involved, the proper analysis would focus on the product sold by Company
I to Company 2, and whether Company 2 sold that product to Company 3 in the same form. See id.
That is, in analyzing whether the resale exception applies to a sale of tangible personal property, a
court should focus on and compare the product sold at each stage in the transactional chain and the
label at each step should be the same. See id. As the statute clearly directs, the analysis differs in
the case of services. Id. The focus should be directed to the benefit received by Company 2 when it
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The Court, however, ignored the directive of O.R.C.
§ 5739.01(E)(1) to treat services and tangible personal property
differently, and began its opinion, and perhaps set the groundwork for its
misapplication of the statute throughout the case, by improperly
paraphrasing the resale exception. 13' After misstating the statutory
resale exception test (a misstatement that eliminated the word "benefit"
from the analysis), the Court misapplied the statute to the facts of the
case several times. 132 In each instance, the Court focused on whether the
trucking companies sold employment services, as those services are
defined in O.R.C. § 5739.01(JJ), and not on whether the trucking
companies resold the benefit of the employment services they purchased
purchased the service and whether that benefit was sold to Company 3 in the same form. Id.
131. See Crew 4 You, Inc. v. Wilkins, 105 Ohio St. 3d 356, 362 (2005). The Court started by
properly stating the statutory test:
R.C. 5739.01(E) excludes from the definition of "retail sale"-and therefore excludes
from the R.C. 5739.02 sales tax on retail sales-any sale "in which the purpose of the
consumer is to resell the thing transferred or benefit of the service provided, by a person
engaging in business, in the form in which the same is, or is to be, received by the
person."
Id. In the very next sentence, however, the Court improperly paraphrased the test in a manner that
eliminates the crucial distinction between tangible personal property and services in the case of the
resale exception. Id. The Court stated:
In other words, when the purchaser's intent in buying a good or service is to resell it to
yet another purchaser without changing the good or service in any way, then the original
purchase is not considered a "retail sale" and is therefore not subject to the sales tax on
retail sales.
Id. The Court paraphrased the statutory exception in such a way that the distinction between
tangible personal property and services disappeared. See id. By paraphrasing the test, the Court
was able to eliminate the word "benefit" from its analysis. See id This set the stage for the balance
of the Court's opinion, where it improperly analyzed the applicability of the resale exception to the
employment services at issue as though the resale was of an item of tangible personal property. See
Crew 4 You, 105 Ohio St. 3d. 356; see also supra note 123 (noting that the Court referenced thirteen
times the fact that the trucking companies did not sell "employment services" as those services are
defined in O.R.C. § 5739.01(JJ)).
132. See Crew 4 You, 105 Ohio St. 3d. at 357 ("[T]hose employment services were not resold
'in the same form in which [they had been] received' by the buyer of them .... ); id. at 363 ("The
personnel services are not resold in the same form in which they are purchased."); id. ("Because ...
Crew 4 You provided an 'employment service' .. . the critical question is whether Crew 4 You
owes the sales tax or whether instead the trucking companies owe the sales tax on the sale of the
employment services that Crew 4 You provided."); id. ("Under the... resale exception, the
trucking companies owe the sales tax if they bought the services but then resold them in the same
form to the broadcasting entities. Otherwise ... Crew 4 You owes the sales tax."); id. at 364
("Because the trucking companies did not sell a taxable 'employment service' to the broadcasting
entities ... the trucking companies cannot be deemed to have resold the employment services that
they purchased from Crew 4 You."); id. at 365 ("The trucking companies did not sell employment
services as those services are defined in R.C. 5739.01(JJ), so those companies certainly cannot be
said to have resold the services purchased form Crew 4 You.").
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from Crew 4 You. 133 The Court practically excluded the word "benefit,"
as in the "benefit" of the service provided, from its opinion.
3 4
As mentioned, the Supreme Court did not focus on the benefit
received by the trucking companies and whether that benefit was
transferred by the trucking companies to the broadcasting entities, where
it was enjoyed by the broadcasting entities.' 35  The BTA, on the other
hand, did properly apply the statute to the facts of the case when it
stated:
The record before us demonstrates that a portion of the transaction
between the trucking companies and the broadcast entities is providing
a flexible and temporary workforce of qualified technicians to operate
the equipment necessary for the broadcast entity to air live coverage of
regional sporting events. Similarly, the trucking company seeks to
outsource its obligation to provide said technicians and contracts with
133. See supra note 123. Amazingly, the Court conceded that the trucking companies resold
the benefit of the employment service. Crew 4 You, 105 Ohio St. 3d at 357. However, under the
Court's misapplication of the statute, it was not enough for the benefit of the service to be resold in
the same form-the Court required the actual service to be resold in the same form, a requirement
not present in the statute. Id. Specifically, the Court stated, "The record reveals rather that the
buyer did pass on the benefit of the employment services to others, but those employment services
were not resold 'in the same form in which [they had been] received' by the buyer of them, as
required by R.C. 5739.01(E), the resale exception statute." Id. As discussed, the resale exception
only requires that the benefit of the service, and not the actual service, be resold in the same form.
See supra note 16 (quoting the statutory text of the resale exception in full). As will be
demonstrated below, the Court enabled itself to focus on whether an employment service was
resold, as opposed to whether the benefit of the service was resold, by inserting the misleading
explanatory parenthetical "[they had been]" in its formulation of the resale exception test. See infra
notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
134. See Crew 4 You, 105 Ohio St. 3d 356. Note that the Tax Commissioner did attempt to
compare the benefit received by the trucking companies with the benefit received by the
broadcasting entities. See id. at 363 ("The Tax Commissioner explained, 'The benefit to the
broadcast entities is not the labor of the technicians; it is the end-product of that labor-staffed
equipment ready for use in broadcasting a sporting event."'). Interestingly, the Court did not accept
the Commissioner's invitation to properly analyze whether the benefit of the service was resold.
See id. In fact, in the very next sentence, the Court, after citing the Commissioner, once again
misstated the proper test when it explained, "In short, the good or service that the trucking
companies received from Crew 4 You was different from the good or service that the broadcasting
entities received from the trucking companies." Id. Clearly, the Commissioner's statement cannot
be interpreted as supporting that conclusion. Rather, the Commissioner was attempting to argue
that the benefit received by the trucking companies (i.e., the labor of the employees) was different
than the benefit received by the broadcasting entities (i.e., staffed equipment ready for use). Id. The
Tax Commissioner's argument was seemingly weak in any event because it would appear that the
broadcasting entities sought more than staffed equipment ready for use-they sought equipment
(provided by the trucking companies) and personnel who could and would operate that equipment to
produce a broadcast (provided by Crew 4 You).
135. See supra note 132 (highlighting several examples of the Court's misapplication of the
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Crew 4 You to provide a flexible and temporary workforce of qualified
technicians. The character of the benefit realized from Crew 4 You to
the trucking company remains unchanged when it is resold to the
broadcast entity.
Though the BTA conducted the proper analysis, the Supreme Court
miraculously claimed that the Board did not engage in the appropriate
inquiry because it did not "examine whether the trucking companies had
acted with 'the purpose ... to resell the thing transferred or the benefit
of the service provided.., in the same form in which [it had been]
received.' ' 137  The Court then declared that "[t]hose critical
requirements of the resale exception in the sales tax statutes were not
satisfied in this case. 138 Thus, in the span of three sentences, the Court
stated the proper test (i.e., that the inquiry should be on whether the
benefit of the service provided was resold in the same form), incorrectly
stated that the BTA did not follow this test ("[t]he BTA went astray by
failing to examine.. . "), and then misapplied the proper test by focusing
on whether the trucking companies sold employment services "as those
services are defined in R.C. 5739.01(JJ)" instead of focusing on the
benefit received by the trucking companies and whether that benefit was
sold in the same form to the broadcasting entities.
139
Based on the foregoing, it is readily apparent that the Court strayed
from applying the resale exception statute consistently with its language.
3. The Court Abandoned its Own Precedent
In addition to misapplying the test dictated by the statute, the Court
misapplied and misconstrued its past service/resale exception cases.
136. Crew 4 You, Inc. v. Zaino, No. 2002-V-958, 2003 Ohio Tax LEXIS 1505, at *17 (Ohio
B.T.A. Oct. 24, 2003). Instead of improperly focusing on the name of the service being provided by
the trucking companies, or whether that service met the definition of an employment service, the
BTA correctly focused on the benefit of the service received by the trucking companies and
compared it to the benefit received by the broadcasting entities. Id. Because the benefit was the
same at each step in the transactional chain, the resale exception applied. Id. ("The benefit of Crew
4 You's personnel services, 'a flexible, temporary workforce,' is passed on through the trucking
company to the broadcast entity.").
137. Crew 4 You, 105 Ohio St. 3d at 365. As discussed immediately above, the BTA most
definitely did analyze whether the trucking companies acted with the purpose of reselling the
benefit of Crew 4 You's service. Crew 4 You, 2003 Ohio Tax LEXIS 1505, at *17 ("Similarly, the
trucking company seeks to outsource its obligation to provide said technicians and contracts with
Crew 4 You to provide a flexible and temporary workforce of qualified technicians.").
138. Crew 4 You, 105 Ohio St. 3d at 365.
139. Id. ("The trucking companies did not sell employment services as those services are
defined in R.C. 5739.01(JJ), so those companies certainly cannot be said to have resold the services
purchased from Crew 4 You.").
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First, the Court disregarded its holding in Bellemar Parts v. Tracy,
where it had acknowledged the distinction between tangible personal
property and services in the context of the resale exception. 140  The
Bellemar Court had also stated the proper application of the resale
exception statute as it applies to services. 141 After properly stating the
resale exception test as it applies to services, and recognizing the
distinction between services and tangible personal property, the
Bellemar Court found that the taxpayer did not resell the employment
service because:
[Bellemar] provided the temporary workers with materials and a
workplace, and supervised and directed them in their job
responsibilities. This, combined with permanent employee labor,
resulted in the finished product. The benefit, therefore, was received
by [Bellemar] and was not resold in the same form. Accordingly, the
resale exception does not apply.
142
The Bellemar Court's significant contribution to the resale
exception analysis, at least in the context of employment services, was to
define the benefit of an employment service. 143 Had the Supreme Court
140. See Bellemar Parts, Inc. v. Tracy, 88 Ohio St. 3d 351, 353-54 (2000), where the Court
stated:
In fact, we agree... that the General Assembly included the term "benefit" to
distinguish between the service purchased and the benefit received. It sought to clarify
that if a service such as landscaping is purchased, the taxpayer need not resell
landscaping services to meet the exception, but need only resell the benefit of those
services, i.e., cared-for grounds.
Id. The most compelling line from the foregoing passage is the Court's recognition that "if a
service such as landscaping is purchased, the taxpayer need not resell landscaping services to meet
the exception, but need only resell the benefit of those services, i.e., cared-for grounds." Id. The
Crew 4 You Court simply abandoned this reasoning. See supra note 132 (discussing the Crew 4 You
Court's focus on whether the trucking companies resold employment services as those services are
defined in O.R.C. § 5739.01(JJ)).
141. Bellemar Parts, 88 Ohio St. 3d at 354. The Bellemar Court correctly stated that "where a
taxpayer contracts with a company for a service and receives and resells the benefit of that service
in the same form, the exception applies." Id.
142. Id. at 353 (explanation added). Despite the fact that the Court's definition of the benefit
of an employment service may have been unduly restrictive, the Court properly analyzed what it
defined as the benefit received by Bellemar (i.e., the labor of the employees) and compared it with
what Bellemar sold its customers (i.e., finished, tangible products). Id. This was an appropriate
analysis because the Court evaluated the benefit received at each step in the transactional chain. See
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5739.01(E)(1) (LexisNexis 1999). See also supra note 16 (quoting in full
the statutory language). This is in stark contrast with the Crew 4 You Court's formulation and
application of the test as it relates to services. See Crew 4 You, 105 Ohio St. 3d at 365 ("The
trucking companies did not sell employment services as those services are defined in R.C.
5739.01(JJ), so those companies certainly cannot be said to have resold the services purchased form
Crew 4 You."); see also supra Part IV.B.2.
143. Bellemar Parts, 88 Ohio St. 3d at 353. The Bellemar Court defined the benefit of an
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in Crew 4 You used the same reasoning it used in Bellemar Parts, and its
definition of the benefit of an employment service-the labor of the
employees-the Court may have reached a different result. 144  Even if
the Court did not find in favor of Crew 4 You, it would have at a
minimum facilitated certainty in the law by consistently applying its
precedent and the clear statutory language of O.R.C. § 5739.01 (E)(1). 145
Also troubling is the Crew 4 You Court's reliance on Bellemar,
particularly the proposition for which the Court cited Bellemar for
support. 146 The Court stated its conclusion, citing Bellemar for support:
In other words, if the trucking companies did not sell employment
services at all, then they certainly did not resell them. See, also,
Bellemar Parts Indus., Inc. v. Tracy (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 351, 353,
354, 2000 Ohio 343, 725 N.E.2d 1132 (explaining that "where a
taxpayer contracts with a company for a service and receives and
resells the benefit of that service in the same form, the [resale]
exception [in R.C. 5739.01(E)] applies," and rejecting a taxpayer's
effort to claim the resale exception when employment services were
not resold in the same form by the buyer of them).147
The Court thus unfairly and inaccurately cited Bellemar for support
and misstated Bellemar's holding by implying that the Bellemar Court
ruled against the taxpayer because the taxpayer did not resell
"employment services."'' 48
employment service as the "labor of the employees, not the product of their work." Id. This made
the Court's analysis in Bellemar relatively simple. See id. Bellemar did not resell the labor of the
temporary employees; it sold the end-product of their labor (finished wheel assemblies). Id. at 353.
144. At the very least, the Court's analysis would have been different. Instead of focusing on
whether the trucking companies sold employment services, the Court would have analyzed whether
the trucking companies sold the "labor of the employees" (i.e., the benefit of an employment
service) to the broadcasting entities. This would have been a much closer call. As the Board of Tax
Appeals noted, "The record before us demonstrates that a portion of the transaction between the
trucking companies and the broadcast entities is providing a flexible and temporary workforce of
qualified technicians to operate the equipment necessary for the broadcast entity to air live coverage
of regional sporting events." Crew 4 You, Inc. v. Zaino, No. 2002-V-958, 2003 Ohio Tax LEXIS
1505, at *17 (Ohio B.T.A. Oct. 24, 2003).
145. See infra Part IV.C.I (discussing the problems now faced by service providers in
determining whether the services they sell are eligible for the resale exception).
146. See Crew 4 You, 105 Ohio St. 3d at 364, where the Court again misapplied the resale
exception and cited Bellemar as support for its misstated formulation of the test.
147. Id. Note here that the Court again focuses on whether the trucking companies sold
employment services. Id.
148. Id. As mentioned, the Bellemar Court did not hold Bellemar's purchases of employment
services ineligible for the resale exception because Bellemar did not sell employment services to its
customers; it held the resale exception inapplicable because Bellemar did not resell the benefit of
the employment service as the Court defined that benefit. Bellemar Parts, 88 Ohio St. 3d at 353.
Thus, the Crew 4 You Court improperly cited Bellemar for the proposition that the second
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One explanation could be as follows: the Court thought that, in
Bellemar, it effectively eliminated all possibility of the resale
exception's applicability to the sale of employment services.
149
Realizing that Bellemar was not expansive enough to eliminate the
resale exception in the case of all employment services, the Ohio
Supreme Court used its opportunity in Crew 4 You to eliminate the
resale exception in the case of employment services once and for all, and
it cited its previous attempt to do so for support, even though a
significant factual distinction existed in Crew 4 You.1
50
The fact that the technicians Crew 4 You provided did not report to
the purchaser's "facility" to provide services was an extremely important
fact, a fact the Crew 4 You Court ignored.151 It is reasonable and logical
that when temporary employees come into a facility, as they did in
Bellemar, the benefit of that service is not resold.152 When, however, the
transaction in a three-party transaction involving employment services needs to be a sale of
employment service in order for the resale exception to apply. Crew 4 You, 105 Ohio St. 3d at 364.
This misstatement appears to provide further evidence that the Court was engaging in a result-
driven analysis. See infra Part IV.C.4.
149. See Bellemar Parts, 88 Ohio St. 3d at 354. The Bellemar Court stated, "Where, however,
an employer contracts for temporary employees to come into its facility and provide labor under its
direction and control, that 'benefit' (the labor) is not resold to its customer in the same form
(labor)." Id. This holding could be read to eliminate the resale exception in all cases in which
employment services are at issue because this statement embodies the typical employment service
arrangement. See Article, The Ohio Supreme Court Justices: A Biographical Sketch, 27 OHIo N.U.
L. REV. 341, 437 (2001), where the author, interpreting Bellemar, stated, "Now that it has been
decided that teimporary employment services are not excluded under the resale exception,
companies may want to look at how the purchase of temporary employment can be excepted from
employment service status under the code." See also supra Part IV.A. I (discussing the possible
motivation for the Court's attempt to eliminate the resale exception in the context of employment
services).
150. One important fact distinguished the services at issue in Bellemar and those being
provided in Crew 4 You: the temporary employees provided in Crew 4 You did not come into the
purchaser's facility and provide labor. Crew 4 You, 105 Ohio St. 3d at 357. The labor was provided
at an off-facility location. Id. Thus, the Crew 4 You Court could not simply cite its holding in
Bellemar as standing for a wholesale ban on the resale exception in the case of all employment
services. But see Corporate Staffing Resources, Inc. v. Zaino, 95 Ohio St. 3d 1 (2002) (holding that
the resale exception does not apply in the context of employment services when the consumer of the
employment services sends the personnel out to its customer's location to perform maintenance on
computers). The Corporate Staffing Resources Court, however, did focus on the benefit of the
service at each step in the transactional chain. Corporate Staffing Resources, 95 Ohio St. 3d at 3
("The benefit to Sarcom's customers, then, was not the labor of CSR technicians, but the end
product of that labor: consistently operating computers.").
151. This distinction, though not discussed by the Court in Crew 4 You, probably explains the
Court's avoidance of its holding in Bellemar that the benefit of an employment service is the labor
of the employees.
152. See Bellemar Parts, 88 Ohio St. 3d at 353. But see id. at 357 (Pfeifer dissenting) (arguing
that the majority defined the benefit of an employment service in an unduly restrictive manner, and
that the benefit of an employment service should be characterized as the end-product of the labor of
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temporary employees are dispatched to a site that is not the "facility" of
the purchaser, and the purchaser is also dispatched to that site, a much
stronger argument can be made that the benefit of the service (i.e., the
labor of the employee) is actually resold. 15 3 The Court misconstrued and
misapplied the statutory test and, as a result, avoided addressing this
argument. 1
54
The Crew 4 You Court also misstated its 2002 holding in Corporate
Staffing Resources, Inc. v. Zaino.1 55  In Corporate Staffing Resources,
the Court affirmed its holding in Bellemar that the benefit of an
employment service is the labor of the employees.1 56 The Crew 4 You
Court, however, cited Corporate Staffing Resources as a case that held
that a sale of employment services did not qualify for the resale
exception when the consumer of those services did not resell the
employment service. 157 Specifically, the Court cited Corporate Staffing
the employees).
153. See Crew 4 You v. Zaino, No. 2002-V-958, 2003 Ohio Tax LEXIS 1505, at *17-18 (Ohio
B.T.A. Oct. 24, 2003), where the BTA stated that the labor of the temporary employees provided by
Crew 4 You was passed through the trucking companies to the broadcasting entities. See also supra
note 136 and accompanying text (discussing the BTA's analysis). It seems significant that both the
temporary employees and the purchaser of the employment service were dispatched to the same
location. In Corporate Staffing Resources, 95 Ohio St.3d 1, the taxpayer argued that because its
technicians were dispatched to a location designated by the purchaser's customers, the benefit
received remained consistent throughout the transactional chain. Corporate Staffing Resources, 95
Ohio St. 3d at 4 ("'[The purchaser] and its customers were joint beneficiaries of the deployment of
CSR technicians to customer sites. The same benefit was received at the same location and at the
same time by both [the purchaser] and its customers."') (explanation added). The Court found this
reasoning flawed and held that the benefit realized by the purchaser of the service was different than
the benefit realized by its customers, notwithstanding the fact that the CSR technicians were
dispatched to an off-site location to perform their tasks. Id. ("[The purchaser] and its customers
have different interests and ultimately realize different, although related, benefits-regardless of
where the laborers perform their work.") (explanation added) (emphasis in original). In Crew 4
You, a much stronger argument existed that the benefit of the labor of the employees remained
consistent throughout the transactional chain because both Crew 4 You and the purchasers of its
services performed their functions at an off-site location for the benefit of the broadcasting entities.
See supra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing the BTA's holding that the benefit of the
employment service was passed through the trucking companies to the broadcasting entities). The
Court did not analyze this nuance using the proper "benefit of the service provided" inquiry, but
instead embarked upon the simply incorrect, and seemingly result-driven, endeavor of determining
whether the trucking companies sold employment services as those services are defined in O.R.C. §
5739.01(JJ). See Crew 4 You, 105 Ohio St. 3d 356. As discussed above, this is not the proper
inquiry in a resale exception case involving services. See supra Part IV.B.2.
154. See supra Part IV.B.2.
155. Corporate Staffing Resources, 95 Ohio St. 3d 1.
156. Id. at 4-5 ("We therefore reaffirm our prior holding that '[w]here a consumer contracts for
temporary employees to add to its workforce, the benefit of that service is the labor of the
employees, not the product of their work."') (quoting Bellemar Parts, 88 Ohio St.3d at 354).
157. Crew 4 You, 105 Ohio St. 3d at 363.
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Resources as a case where it "determined that a provider of employment
services was not entitled to the resale exception when the computer
hardware company that hired the temporary employees from the
employment service provider did not resell those services."'' 58 What the
Corporate Staffing Resources Court actually said, however, was that:
[W]here a consumer contracts for temporary employees to add to its
workforce, the benefit of that service is the labor of the employees, not
the product of their work. Because it is the consumer of the services,
not its customer, that receives the benefit of the service, the benefit is
not resold in the same form and the resale exception from the sales tax
does not apply. Accordingly, we hold that Sarcom did not resell in the
same form the actual benefit it realized from its transactions with CSR
to those customers who had purchased the service agreement. 
59
Thus, the Crew 4 You Court improperly stated that the Court in
Corporate Staffing Resources found the resale exception inapplicable
because the purchaser of the services did not resell "employment
services," whereas the Court in Corporate Staffing Resources properly
focused on the benefit of those services and found that the purchaser of
the employment service consumed and did not resell that benefit. 160 The
Court, in essence, attempted to impute its faulty reasoning in Crew 4
You to a prior case where its reasoning was proper in an effort to
legitimize its present misapplication of the statute.' 6'
The Court once again misstated the proper test for determining
whether the resale exception applies to a sale of services when,
summarizing the facts and holding of Corporate Staffing Resources, it
158. Id. This statement is familiar, of course, because it is the same approach the Court took
when it inaccurately summarized its holding in Bellemar. See supra note 148.
159. Corporate Staffing Resources, 95 Ohio St. 3d at 4-5 (quoting Bellemar Parts, 88 Ohio St.
3d at 354) (internal citation omitted). Note here that the Corporate Staffing Resources Court
properly applied the statutory test for the resale exception in the context of services by focusing on
the "actual benefit" received by the consumer of the service and whether that benefit was resold in
the same form. Id. This was the same analysis conducted by the Bellemar Court and the Board of
Tax Appeals in Crew 4 You. Bellemar Parts, 88 Ohio St. 3d at 353; Crew 4 You v. Zaino, No.
2002-V-958, 2003 Ohio Tax LEXIS 1505, at *13 (Ohio B.T.A. Oct. 24, 2003).
160. Crew 4 You, 105 Ohio St. 3d at 363; Corporate Staffing Resources, 95 Ohio St. 3d at 4-5.
161. Crew 4 You, 105 Ohio St. 3d at 363. The Court's inaccurate characterization of both
Bellemar and Corporate Staffing Resources lends support to the theory that the Court's analysis was
result-driven. See infra Parts IV.B.4, V; see also supra Part IV.A.I (discussing the possibility that
the Court may have sought to eliminate the resale exception's applicability to employment services
out of fear that the exception would substantially reduce the tax revenues generated by the tax on
employment services). It could, of course, be argued that the Court's analysis was not result-driven,
and that the case was simply one that is inherently subject to a difference of opinion. However, the
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stated: "Those services were not, in other words, resold 'in the same
form in which [they had been] received,' as would be required for the
R.C. 5739.01(E) resale exception to apply to the initial sale of the
employment services. 1 62 The Court was again misapplying the statute
and it needed to improperly quote, through the use of a misleading
parenthetical, one of its prior holdings to conform to its
misapplication. 163
As evidence of this, note that when the Court summarized its
holding in Corporate Staffing Resources, it referred to the statutory
provision embodying the resale exception, O.R.C. § 5739.01(E)(1), and
stated that the services at issue in Corporate Staffing Resources, were
not resold "'in the same form in which [they had been] received,' as
would be required for the R.C. 5739.01(E) resale exception to
apply.. . -"'64 The Court thus intimated that O.R.C. § 5739.01(E)(1)
required that the services, and not the benefit of those services, must be
resold in the same form as they had been received for the resale
exception to apply.165 Of course, the statute dictates not that the services
must be resold in the same form in which "they had been received," but
that the benefit of that service must be resold in the same form in which
it had been received. 166 The fact that the Court added this misleading
parenthetical tends to indicate that it was consciously avoiding the
proper test and misapplying the statute.'
67
4. The Court's Opinion Amounted to Judicial Lawmaking
The Tax Commissioner forcefully argued that the resale exception
should not apply to Crew 4 You's sale of employment services because
the transaction between the trucking companies and the broadcasting
162. Crew 4 You, 105 Ohio St. 3d at 363-64. As mentioned throughout, the proper inquiry is
not whether the service is resold; it is whether the benefit of that service is resold. See supra Part
IV.B.2. In fact, the Corporate Staffing Resources Court took note of the correct application of the
test when it said, "[T]he proper inquiry is a focus on the actual benefit received and not on the
service purchased." Corporate Staffing Resources, 95 Ohio St. 3d at 4. The Crew 4 You Court did
not follow the "proper inquiry," but instead focused on the service being provided rather than the
benefit of that service. See supra notes 130-135 and accompanying text.
163. Crew 4 You, 105 Ohio St. 3d at 363-64.
164. Id. Of importance here is that the Court supplied an explanatory parenthetical ([they had
been]) in summarizing its holding in Corporate Staffing Resources and paraphrasing the applicable
statutory test. Id.
165. Id.
166. See OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5739.01(E)(1) (LexisNexis 1999).
167. See infra Part V, concluding that the Court's analysis was result-driven and that the Court
was cognizant of its misapplication of the statute and its precedent.
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entities was not a taxable "sale," as defined in O.R.C. § 5739.01(B). 161
168. Initial Merit Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee at 4, Crew 4 You, Inc. v. Zaino, 105 Ohio
St. 3d 356 (2005) (No. 03-1960). The Commissioner specifically argued:
Because the transactions between the trucking companies and the broadcast entities
would not be "sales," not recognizing a "sale-for-resale" exception in this case would
lead only to the imposition of tax on the one, final sale of "employment service" by
Crew 4 You. If that sale were excepted from sales tax, the result would be no tax on
either transaction. What Crew 4 You seeks is not to avoid "double taxation," but to
avoid any taxation at all.
Id. (emphasis in original). Interestingly, the Tax Commissioner resorted to this argument after
abandoning his argument, made at the Board of Tax Appeals, that the benefit received by the
broadcasting entities was the same as the benefit received by the trucking companies. Id. at 3
("[T]he evidence here strongly indicates the benefit of the employment service provided to the
purchaser did pass through in the same form to the purchaser's own consumer."). The Tax
Commissioner agreed that there has never been a stated requirement that the second transaction
must be a taxable sale. See Initial Merit Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee supra at 11 ("[T]hese
cases typically do not directly hold the proposition that the subsequent transaction must be a sales-
tax 'sale,' but their analysis relies upon it."). Though the requirement has never been definitively
stated, the Tax Commissioner's assertion that the second transaction must be a taxable "sale," as
defined in O.R.C. § 5739.01(B), is not without merit. O.R.C. §5739.02 levies an excise tax on retail
"sales," and O.R.C. § 5739.01(B) defines the transactions that qualify as "sales" for this purpose.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5739.02 and 5739.01(B) (LexisNexis 1999). Thus, it could be argued
that in order for the benefit of a service to be "resold," a purchaser would have to convey the benefit
of that sale in a transaction that is defined as a "sale" by O.R.C. § 5739.01(B). Id.
Nevertheless, prior case law applying the resale exception to sales of tangible personal
property supports the position that the second transaction need not be a taxable sale. For example,
in Procter & Gamble Co. v. Lindley, 17 Ohio St. 3d 71 (1985), the Court analyzed whether Procter
& Gamble's transfer of artwork to its packaging suppliers, subject to a requirements contract
whereby the supplier would use the artwork solely to produce all the packaging materials required
by Procter & Gamble, qualified as a sale as defined in O.R.C. § 5739.01(B). At the time, O.R.C. §
5739.01(B) defined a sale as "all transactions by which title or possession, or both, of tangible
personal property, is or is to be transferred, or a license to use or consume tangible personal
property is or is to be granted for a consideration." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5739.01(B)
(LexisNexis 1985). Similarly, in General Motors Corp. v. Kosydar, 37 Ohio St. 2d 138 (1974), the
Court considered whether General Motors' transfer of tooling to its suppliers for use in making parts
to be exclusively manufactured for General Motors, pursuant to a requirements contract, constituted
a "sale" under the sales tax statutes. In both cases, the Court found that the existence of the
requirements contracts between the purchaser of the property and the party to whom the purchaser
granted a license to use that property was a sufficient legal detriment to constitute "consideration."
Procter & Gamble, 17 Ohio St. 3d at 76; General Motors, 37 Ohio St. 2d at 147. Thus, the initial
purchase of the tangible personal property (i.e., the artwork by Procter & Gamble and the tooling by
General Motors) was eligible for the resale exception even though the subsequent transfer of that
property was not a taxable event (how would one value the detriment of entering into a
requirements contract or assess a sales tax on that detriment?). What is interesting is that, according
to General Motors and Procter & Gamble, a transfer of tangible personal property can constitute a
"sale" and not be subject to sales tax. Procter & Gamble, 17 Ohio St. 3d at 76; General Motors, 37
Ohio St. 2d at 147.
The application of the resale exception to tangible personal property is fairly
straightforward because the definition of a "sale" of tangible personal property is generally
straightforward. In the context of services, on the other hand, the "benefit inquiry" has confused the
resale exception analysis, and the Court has not dealt consistently with the exception as it applies to
services. Compare CCH Computax v. Tracy, 68 Ohio St. 3d 86 (1993) (finding that the resale
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As support for this proposition, the Commissioner relied on Hyatt Corp.
v. Limbach, one of the Court's previous cases applying the resale
exception to services. 169 The Commissioner argued that the distinction
made in Hyatt was clear-cut, and its application to the facts of Crew 4
You straightforward.17
0
exception applied despite the fact that the second transaction in the two-transaction chain was a non-
taxable professional accounting service, and not a taxable "sale") with Hyatt Corp. v. Limbach, 69
Ohio St. 3d 537 (1994) (disallowing the resale exception where the second transaction in the two-
transaction chain was not a "sale" for purposes of the sales tax statutes). Additionally, the Court's
own hypothetical application of the resale exception in Bellemar blessed a resale of the benefit of a
landscaping service (cared-for grounds) where a sale of that benefit is not a "sale" for purposes of
the sales tax statutes.
169. Hyatt, 69 Ohio St. 3d 537. Recall that in Hyatt the Court concluded that a hotel resold the
benefit of a linen cleaning service to its customers who stayed for less than thirty days because a
sale to such a customer was taxable, but that because sales to guests who stayed long-term were not
taxable, the resale exception did not apply to those sales. Id. at 540. The Hyatt Court cited CCH
Computax, 68 Ohio St. 3d 86, for the proposition that the resale exception applied to Hyatt's
purchase of the linen cleaning service when it rented a room to short-term customers because
Hyatt's guests received the benefit of the linen cleaning service. Id. In the very next paragraph, the
Court held that when Hyatt rented rooms to long-term guests, the resale exception did not apply to
its purchase of linen cleaning services because a long-term rental is not a "sale" for sales tax
purposes, and the benefit of the linen cleaning service was accordingly not "resold." Id. What is
interesting, and perhaps ironic, is that in CCH Computax the transactions between the purchaser of
the service and its customers were not subject to sales tax. See CCH Computax, 68 Ohio St. 3d 86;
see also supra note 30 (discussing the fact that the transaction between the tax professionals, who
purchased the data processing services of CCH Computax, and their customers were not subject to
sales tax and noting that the Court did not address that fact). Thus, the Court cited a case for
support and then seemingly created an additional element to the resale exception that was not
required in that case.
Given the Court's difficulty in articulating the resale exception as it applies to services, as
evidenced by its conflicting precedent, and the lack of analysis in Hyatt concerning the rejection of
the resale exception therein, Hyatt should not be read as standing for the blanket proposition that the
second transaction in the two-transaction chain must be a taxable sale-particularly as Hyatt
predated Bellemar. See supra note 168. Most importantly, the Crew 4 You Court did not
definitively state that it was deciding the case on such grounds, nor was its analysis consistent with
a decision on such grounds. See infra note 100 (highlighting the Court's ultimate reasoning in
deciding against Crew 4 You). Further, had the Court interpreted its Hyatt decision as standing for
the proposition that the second transaction in the two-transaction chain must be a "sale" as defined
in O.R.C. § 5739.01(B), its dismissal of Crew 4 You's claim would likely have been as brief as was
its dismissal of Hyatt's claim when Hyatt rented to long-term guests. See supra note 38
(reproducing the Court's two-sentence dismissal of Hyatt's claim of a resale in the case of rentals to
long-term guests). Instead, the Court eliminated the word "benefit" from the resale exception and
analyzed whether the service the trucking companies sold was the same as the service Crew 4 You
sold. See infra Part IV.B.2; see also infra note 100. Had the Court announced a rule that the second
transaction must be a taxable sale-and if its opinion would have conformed therewith-its opinion
would have been more credible and less confusing. Of course, the Court may have had difficulty
reconciling its past resale exception/services cases had it decided Crew 4 You on such grounds.
170. Initial Merit Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee supra note 168, at 13 ("Applying Hyatt to
the present case is straightforward. Crew 4 You did not prove, and in fact the record militates
against any finding that the trucking companies made sales-tax 'sales' with respect to the provision
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The Court did not accept the Tax Commissioner's invitation to
decide Crew 4 You by creating a requirement that is not expressly
present in the statute.' 71 The Court did reference its opinion in Hyatt,
but not in support of a requirement that the second transaction in the
transactional chain must be a taxable sale.
172
of Crew 4 You's services."). Despite his insistence that the decision in Hyatt was directly on point,
the Tax Commissioner ultimately gravitated towards (and possibly encouraged the Court to adopt)
the faulty premise that because the trucking companies did not sell employment services as those
services are defined in O.R.C. § 5739.01(JJ), the resale exception could not apply to Crew 4 You's
sale of employment services to the trucking companies. Id. at 18. Specifically, the Tax
Commissioner stated, "Since the trucking companies could not be found to be selling employment
services, it follows by iron force of logic that they did not resell the service purchased from Crew 4
You." Id.
171. See Crew 4 You, Inc. v. Wilkins, 105 Ohio St. 3d 356 (2005). Perhaps the Court realized
that, notwithstanding its holding in Hyatt, it should not so simply dismiss a case on a requirement
that is not present in the statute-a requirement that the second transaction in the transaction chain
be a taxable transaction. If the Court felt that such a requirement should exist, the Court should
have expressed that sentiment in its opinion and asked for legislative action. Because the Court
misapplied the statute, however, and did not focus on whether the benefit of the employment service
was resold, and because an actual employment service can never be resold (because of the
requirement that the provider of the employment service must pay the wages of the temporary
personnel), it was not necessary for the Court to appeal to the legislature for action because the
Court's decision precluded the resale exception's applicability to employment services. See supra
note 127 (noting that the Court's analysis, by default, foreclosed the possibility that the resale
exception could apply when employment services are sold).
172. Crew 4 You, 105 Ohio St. 3d at 364. The Court specifically stated:
[B]ecause a hotel's act of renting rooms to guests for stays of more than 30 consecutive
days was exempted from the sales tax ... the hotel could not be deemed to have "resold"
the use of linens in those rooms that the hotel had paid to have cleaned by a linen-
cleaning service.
Id. However, when the Court cited Hyatt, it was not in the midst of arguing that the second
transaction in a three-party transaction must be taxable; it was arguing that if the second party to the
transaction (the purchaser of the taxable service) does not sell the taxable service, the first party to
the transaction (the provider of the taxable service) owes the sales tax on the sale of the service. Id.
Immediately before citing Hyatt, the Court cited Corporate Staffing Resources, Inc. v. Zaino, 95
Ohio St.3d 1 (2002), improperly characterizing it as a case holding that the actual taxable service
purchased must be resold before the resale exception will apply. Id. The Court specifically stated:
The employment services were not resold by the computer company in Corporate
Staffing Resources or by the trucking companies in this case. The company that did sell
an "employment service" as that term is defined in R.C. 5739.01(JJ) was Crew 4 You,
and that company now owes taxes, as did the employment-service provider in Corporate
Staffing Resources.
Id.; see also supra Part IV.B.3 (detailing the many instances in Crew 4 You where the Court
misconstrued and mischaracterized its precedent, including Corporate Staffing Resources). Oddly,
and immediately after this passage, the Court stated, "Other decisions from this court support that
view," and then proceeded to cite Hyatt, as reproduced immediately above. Crew 4 You, 105 Ohio
St. 3d at 364. In the passage cited from Hyatt, the Hyatt court did not hold the resale exception
inapplicable because Hyatt did not sell "linen cleaning services;" it held the resale exception
inapplicable because the Hotel's long-term rentals were not taxable "sales." Hyatt, 69 Ohio St. 3d
at 540. As mentioned above, the Court likely realized that it could not cite Hyatt for the proposition
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Thus, the Court attempted to reign in its prior, statutorily
unwarranted holding in Hyatt, and it declined to decide Crew 4 You
consistently with Hyatt, despite the Tax Commissioner's urging.1 73  Yet
the Court did effectively engage in judicial lawmaking-the Court
created a law, though not expressly stated, that the resale exception does
not apply to sales of employment services. 174  It seems clear that the
Court was committed to ruling against the taxpayer and to reaching a
specific result-a result that would once and for all eliminate all
concerns that the resale exception would engulf the tax on employment
services. 1
75
What is most remarkable about Crew 4 You is the length to which
the Court went to reach its desired result. 176  An act of judicial
for which it actually stands (i.e., the second transaction must be a taxable sale) because the
requirement implicit in that holding does not expressly exist in the statute. See supra note 171.
Immediately after citing Hyatt (a case holding the resale exception inapplicable where the second
transaction in the two-transaction chain is not a taxable sale), the Court stated:
The same principle applies in this case: Because the trucking companies did not sell a
taxable "employment service" to the broadcasting entities - because the provider of
"employment service" under R.C. 5739.01(JJ) must pay the "wages, salary, or other
compensation" of the workers, and Crew 4 You (rather than the trucking companies)
paid the workers' wages - the trucking companies cannot be deemed to have resold the
employment services that they purchased from Crew 4 You. In other words, if the
trucking companies did not sell employment services at all, then they certainly did not
resell them.
Crew 4 You, 105 Ohio St. 3d at 364. What is apparent from these passages, when read together, is
that the Court was not attempting to rely on the requirement, seemingly created in Hyatt, that the
second transaction in the transactional chain must be taxable. It appears that the Court was simply
mischaracterizing yet another one of its holdings to conform to its misapplication of the resale
exception test in the case of services. See supra Part IV.B.3 (detailing other examples of the Court
misstating its prior holdings to conform to its reasoning in Crew 4 You).
173. See supra note 171.
174. As mentioned, by inappropriately focusing on whether the trucking companies sold
employment services, as those services are defined by O.R.C. § 5739.01(JJ), the Court precluded
the possibility of an employment service being eligible for the resale exception. See supra note 127
(explaining that, because a provider of an employment service must pay the wages of the temporary
employees, a purchaser of an employment service can never resell those services).
175. See supra Part IV.A.I (discussing the possibility that Court's employment service
jurisprudence was influenced by an unstated concern that the tax on employment services would be
effectively eliminated if the resale exception applied to such services).
176. See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the Court's repeated misapplication and misstatement
of the statutory language embodying the resale exception); see also supra Part IV.B.3 (discussing
the Court's mischaracterization of many of its prior holdings such that the holdings appeared to
support the Court's flawed analysis in Crew 4 You). For an analysis of the judiciary's role in the
lawmaking process, see Sol Wachtler, Judicial Lawmaking, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1990) (assessing
the legitimacy of judicial lawmaking and refuting the traditional justifications supporting judicial
lawmaking, while concluding that the proximity of the judiciary to the facts from which law often
springs legitimizes a limited judicial lawmaking role). For a criticism of the Ohio Supreme Court
and its recent forays into judicial lawmaking, see David N. Mayer and David J. Owsiany, After
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lawmaking seems particularly egregious where, as in Crew 4 You, a
court employs a misleading analysis to legitimize its faulty reasoning
with the end result being that a statutory exception is made inapplicable
to a provision despite the fact that the legislature did not exclude that
provision from the exception's reach. 177
C. The Effect of the Court's Opinion
A fundamental problem facing taxpayers after Crew 4 You is
determining whether their transactions qualify for the resale exception.
Prior to Crew 4 You, many taxpayers, relying on past precedent, may
have provided a service without collecting sales tax on that service,
believing that it was eligible for the resale exception because the
purchaser of that service sold the benefit of that service to its
customers. 178 For instance, relying on CCH Computax, Inc. v. Tracy,
179
a taxpayer might have assumed that if it provides automatic data
processing (normally a taxable service) to its customers, and its
customers in turn sell the benefit of that service (the tangible output) in
the same form to its own customers, it need not collect sales tax on its
sales of the automatic data processing because those sales are eligible for
the resale exception.1
80
After Crew 4 You, however, that same taxpayer may be concerned
that it no longer qualifies for the resale exception because its customers
DeRoph IIL" Who Makes Public Policy in Ohio, the Legislature or the Courts, THE BUCKEYE INST.
FOR PUB. POL'Y SOLUTIONS, Dec. 1, 2001, at 1, http://www.buckeyeinstitute.org/docs/
Public PolicyBrief DeRolph_III.pdf, where the authors, in their executive summary, state, "If
judicial lawmaking is not stopped, Ohioans will lose one of their most precious rights, the right to
be governed only by laws legitimately passed by the only body authorized under the Constitution to
make new law: the General Assembly."
177. In this regard, it is interesting that the Court did not render their decision in Crew 4 You
on policy grounds. That is, in arriving at its decision the Court did not analyze the tax on
employment services and the legislative history of the tax, or whether the resale exception would
prohibitively reduce the tax base derived from the tax on employment services. These arguments
were, however, made by the Tax Commissioner in Bellemar Parts Industries, Inc. v. Tracy, 88 Ohio
St. 3d 351 (2000). See Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee at 18, Bellemar Parts Industries, Inc.
v.Tracy, 88 Ohio St. 3d 351 (2000) (No. 98-2516). Had the Court used such reasoning, it would
have been directly confronting the legislature, but its opinion would have had more legitimacy.
178. See, e.g., Corporate Staffing Resources, Inc. v. Zaino, 95 Ohio St. 3d 1 (2002); Bellemar
Parts, 88 Ohio St. 3d 351; CCH Computax, Inc. v. Tracy, 68 Ohio St. 3d 86 (1993). In each of
these cases, the Court properly applied the resale exception, inquiring into whether the benefit of a
service, rather than the actual service itself, is resold. See also OHIO REV. CODE. ANN.
§ 5739.01(E)(1) (LexisNexis 1999) (excluding from taxation transactions in which the purpose of
the consumer "is to resell the thing transferred or benefit of the service provided, by a person
engaging in business, in the form in which the same is, or is to be, received by the person.").
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do not provide automatic data processing services to their customers."'
Consider once again the Bellemar Court's recognition that services and
tangible personal property are to be treated differently under the resale
exception of O.R.C. § 5739.01(E)(1):
In fact, we agree ... that the General Assembly included the term
"benefit" to distinguish between the service purchased and the benefit
received. It sought to clarify that if a service such as landscaping is
purchased, the taxpayer need not resell landscaping services to meet
the exception, but need only resell the benefit of those services, i.e.,
cared-for grounds.
182
Might the hypothetical taxpayer to whom the Bellemar Court
referred be concerned that it no longer qualifies for the resale exception
unless it actually resells landscaping services, and not simply cared-for
grounds? Until the Court reaffirms that it will follow the resale
exception as enacted by the General Assembly, uncertainty will remain.
The Court could also clarify its position judicially, but this alternative
seems rather unlikely given its analysis in Crew 4 You.
For the Court to eliminate the uncertainty it created in Crew 4 You,
it would have to reaffirm its past precedent and once again acknowledge
that the proper inquiry in resale exception/service cases is upon the
benefit of the service provided and whether that benefit is resold, while
at the same time reconciling its holding in Crew 4 You. The only way it
could reconcile that holding would be to explain that the analysis differs
when the service being provided is an employment service. Clearly,
such a pronouncement would run counter to legislative intent, as no such
"carve out" exists in the Revised Code.
D. Fixing the Problem-A Call for Action and Recommendations
An important factor contributing to the Court's inconsistent and
awkward resale exception jurisprudence, as it applies to employment
services, is the language of the resale exception itself18 3 Indeed, much
of the confusion surrounding the application of the resale exception to
employment services is attributable to the statutorily required inquiry
into whether the purpose of the purchaser of the service is to resell the
181. See infra Part IV.B.2 (noting that the Court in Crew 4 You improperly focused on whether
the second party in a three-party transaction resold the same service as the first party, rather than
properly focusing on whether the benefit of the first service is resold in the same form).
182. Bellemar Parts, 88 Ohio St. 3d at 353-54.
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benefit of that service in the same form.1 84  The difficulty arises in
defining the benefit of an employment service and in determining
whether that benefit is resold in the same form. 185 The Court has fairly
consistently, and without debate or confusion, defined the benefit of
most services as the end-product of those services, 186 yet the benefit of
an employment service has not been so easily defined.' 87 This is likely
because, while most services produce the same end-product, an
employment service can produce a variety of end-products. It is perhaps
this reason that compelled the Bellemar Court to announce that the
benefit of an employment service is the labor of the employees and not
the end-product of that labor. 1
88
Even accepting the Bellemar Court's definition of the benefit of an
employment service as the labor of the employees, how is one to
rationally and consistently determine whether that benefit is resold? For
these reasons, the Ohio legislature should adopt legislation that more
clearly expresses its intent regarding whether employment services
should be eligible for the resale exception. 189  It is patently unfair to
employment service providers that their service, and their service alone,
has been judicially rendered ineligible for an exception statutorily made
available to all services if the requirements thereof are satisfied.
Perhaps a more reasonable approach would be the approach
adopted by the Wisconsin Department of Revenue. Employment
184. As evidenced above, the Court has had difficulty consistently applying the resale
exception to employment services. Compare Bellemar Parts, 88 Ohio St. 3d 351, 354 (holding the
resale exception inapplicable to a purchase of employment services because the purchaser
consumed rather than sold the benefit of that services) with Crew 4 You, Inc. v. Wilkins, 105 Ohio
St. 3d 356, 365 (2005) (holding that a purchase of employment services did not qualify for the
resale exception because the purchaser of those services did not resell "employment services").
185. The Court in Crew 4 You did not engage in this inquiry, instead focusing on whether the
employment service was resold in the same form. See supra notes 131-34 (discussing the Crew 4
You Court's formulation of the resale exception test and how that formulation was inconsistent with
the statute).
186. See infra notes 110-21 and accompanying text (highlighting instances of the Court
defining the benefit of a service to be the end-product of that service).
187. See, e.g., Bellemar Parts, 88 Ohio St. 3d 351, where the majority and dissent disagreed
over the characterization of the benefit of an employment service. Compare Bellemar Parts, 88
Ohio St.3d at 354 ("We conclude, therefore, that where a consumer contracts for temporary
employees to add to its work force, the benefit of that service is the labor of the employees, not the
product of their work.") with Bellemar Parts, 88 Ohio St.3d at 357 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) ("The
only way to fairly characterize the benefit of service [sic] is to look to the finished product, i.e.,
what the service yields.").
188. Bellemar Parts, 88 Ohio St. 3d at 354.
189. This is especially so considering that after Crew 4 You, employment services cannot
qualify for the resale exception. See supra note 127 (explaining why, under the Court's rationale, a
purchase of employment services can never qualify for the resale exception).
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services are not taxable under the Wisconsin Statutes. 190 Nevertheless,
in Wisconsin Tax Bulletin 141, released January 2005, the Wisconsin
Department of Revenue indicated that it will interpret the sales tax
statutes such that employment services will be taxable if the service
being performed by the temporary employee at the direction of the
purchaser of the employment service is taxable. 191 Thus, in Wisconsin,
for a determination of whether temporary employment services are
taxable, one must look to the service being performed by the temporary
employee to determine if that service is taxable under Wis. Stat.
§ 77.52(2)(a)1-20. If so, the charge by the employment service provider
is subject to sales tax.192
This approach has appeal, particularly in light of the confusion and
uncertainty created by the decision in Crew 4 You. Perhaps the awkward
nature by which the current resale exception is applied to employment
services is grounds for the enactment of an employment service-specific
resale exception provision. The approach of the Wisconsin Department
of Revenue is one example of how a tax and resale exception can be
fairly and consistently applied to a sale of employment services.
190. See WIS. STAT. § 77.52(2)(a) 1-20 (2005) (defining the services that are subject to
Wisconsin sales tax).
191. Wisconsin Tax Bulletin No. 141 (Jan. 2005) at 31-37. This approach is rational, but hotly
contested because the Wisconsin Legislature has not expressly made employment services taxable.
See Memorandum from Joan Hansen, Director of Tax & Corporate Policy, Wisconsin
Manufacturers & Commerce, to WMC Members Interested in Temporary Employment Services
(Feb. 15, 2005), http://www.wmc.org/printdisplay.cfm?ID=910 (discussing the lack of statutory
authority for the imposition of a tax on employment services and protesting the Wisconsin
Department of Revenue's attempt to tax those services by looking through to the work being
performed by the temporary employee). Because employment services are already subject to Ohio
sales tax, little or no resistance would exist if the Wisconsin approach were implemented.
192. See Wisconsin Tax Bulletin No. 141 (Jan. 2005) at 31-37. The Wisconsin Department of
Revenue is receptive to resale exception claims if the service being performed by the temporary
employee is the same service being sold by the purchaser of the employment services. Id. In
Example 8 of Wisconsin Tax Bulletin 141, a landscaping company purchases employment services,
and the temporary employees perform landscaping work for the customers of the purchaser of the
employment services. Id. at 37. Landscaping services are subject to sales tax in Wisconsin. WIS.
STAT. § 77.52(2)(a) 20 (2005). The Example says that the charge for the employment service is not
subject to sales tax because the services are for resale. Wisconsin Tax Bulletin 141 at 37. The
employees are mowing, fertilizing and planting grass, but the purchaser of the employment services
is deemed to be reselling those services to its customers. Id. No resale exists in Example 1,
however, where a temporary service provider contracts with the owner of an office complex to
provide employees for on-site facility operations. Id. at 32-33. When a temporary employee
performs landscaping services under such circumstances, the charge associated with that employee
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V. CONCLUSION
In Crew 4 You, the Ohio Supreme Court apparently set out to do
one thing, and one thing only-to permanently eliminate any chance that
the resale exception could apply to a sale of employment services. By
employing this result-driven analysis, the Court engaged in judicial
lawmaking by removing from the ambit of a statutorily created
exception a service that the General Assembly did not choose to remove
therefrom. The Court made law-solely because of the Court's opinion
in Crew 4 You, the resale exception does not apply in any case where the
service upon which the exception is claimed is an employment service.
To achieve this result, the Court had to misconstrue both the statutory
text embodying the resale exception and the Court's own precedent. In
so doing, the Court created uncertainty for all taxpayers, in general, and
service providers in particular, as they now must wonder whether the
Court will apply to them the incorrect reasoning employed in Crew 4
You, or whether it will instead follow clear statutory language and
precedent.
Jon R. Stefanik II
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